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FAMILY LAW
by
Joseph W. McKnight*
EXCEPT for (1) provisions with respect to the elderly which have not
yet been formulated, (2) existing rules with respect to both the young and
old which might be shifted from the Probate Code to the Family Code, and
(3) repairs which must be made from time to time due to a variety of oversights, the Texas Family Code became effective as a coherent whole on January 1, 1974, and began to receive authoritative interpretation from the
courts. The most significant developments were directed to provisions originally enacted in 1967 with respect to matrimonial property.
At the national level two pieces of legislation with great potential impact
on family law were enacted: the Pension Reform Act of 1974 and the Social
Service Amendments of 1974.

I. SPOUSES
A.

Status

The condition of marriage and its consequences came before the courts
in several unusual but interrelated circumstances. In one instance' the state
policy favoring marriage was utilized to support the conclusion that a school
district's regulations prohibiting married high school students from participating in extra-curricular activities is unconstitutional as violating the doctrine
of equal protection. 2 In another,8 involving the validity of a Bhuddist marriage entered into in Singapore, the court provided an authoritative definition
of the quantum of proof necessary to rebut the presumption of validity of
a subsequent marriage in favor of a former one. 4 The court also provided
*

B.A., The University of Texas; B.C.L., M.A., Oxford University; LL.M., Co-

lumbia University. Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
1. Bell v. Lone Oak School Dist., 507 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana

1974), error granted, 515 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. 1974). The court stated that "[i1t is the
public policy of this state to encourage marriage rather than living together unmarried."
507 S.W.2d at 638. The court recognized that its decision was in direct opposition to
another case, Kissick v. Garland Ind. School Dist., 330 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.), which had held, on similar facts, that it was not unreasonable to bar married students from participating in athletics and other extracurricular
activities. 507 S.W.2d at 638. The reasoning in Bell is clearly preferable.
2. Without any reference to local policy favoring one marriage over the other, a
federal court sitting in Pennsylvania found proof of a first marriage without proof of
its dissolution conclusive over a second ceremonial marriage for the purposes of awarding social security benefits to the "widow" of the deceased wage earner. Visconti v. Secretary of H.E.W., 374 F. Supp. 1272 (W.D. Pa. 1974), a case in many respects reminiscent of Caruso v. Lucius, 448 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1969, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
3. Davis v. Davis, 521 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. 1975), discussed infra notes 206-08 in
another context.
4. Relying on Caruso v. Lucius, 448 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1969,
writ ref'd n.r.e.), the court also held that in order to rebut the presumption of the validity of a later marriage the contestant need only show that the prior marriage was not
dissolved in those jurisdictions where the other spouse might reasonably have been expected to achieve dissolution.
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an equally authoritative reanalysis of putative marriage. The supreme court
held that a putative marriage exists as a matter of law until the spouse asserting it has certain knowledge of an impediment to the marriage and, hence,
is no longer a putative spouse in good faith. The result was to restore to
the putative subsequent wife what she had lost by the proof of validity of
an existing prior marriage of her husband. 5
Though informal marriages are far more frequently asserted than proved,"
their status and the function of the declaration provided by statute to implement proof continues to be misunderstood.7 It was inquired of the Attorney
General of Texas whether a couple ceremonially married might file a declaration of an earlier informal marriage in order to substantiate its prior existence. 8 Though no opinion was rendered in response to the inquiry, there
would not seem to be any reason why such a declaration might not be recorded for the purpose intended. With respect to procuring a license as a
prerequisite to entering into a ceremonial marriage, the attorney general expressed the view that a judicial waiver of factual information (previously authorized by statute) is no longer allowed, 9 though the district court may waive
age requirements for procuring a marriage license when good cause is
shown. 10
The attorney general was also called upon to clarify one of the problems
of public identification: a person's choice of name and the consequences of
marriage on the identification of spouses by name. A preoccupation with
formalism and convention tends to prejudge the concept of "legal name" in
the public mind. For purposes of recordation, notice, and the issuance of
various types of identification devices, public agencies are, nonetheless, in
5. Though no appeal was taken with respect to the ultimate division of the property
of the intestate husband, the result was that the surviving widow took the wife's share
of the community and the husband's share was divided between the putative wife and
the husband's descendants. In Caruso v. Lucius, 448 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the putative wife took the wife's share of the community
and the husband's half was divided between the widow and the heirs of the husband.
See McKnight & Raggio, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 25 Sw. L.J. 34,
44-45 (1971). Both cases are in agreement in rejecting the line of authority which had
required that in order to share in the profits of the putative marriage, the putative spouse
should prove participation in acquisition of property which vested during that marriage.
Id. See also McKnight, Commentary to the Texas Family Code, Title 1, 5 TEx. TEcH
L.R.Ev. 281, 310, 340 (1974).
6. See, e.g., Peters v. Weinberger, 377 F. Supp. 294 (M.D. Fla. 1974); Archie v.
State, 511 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). But see Old Republic Ins. Co. v.
Christian, 389 F. Supp. 335 (E.D. Tenn. 1975).
7. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 1.91-.95 (1975).

8. TEx. AT-'y GEN. RQ-540 (1974). The file was closed without rendering an
opinion. (Nov. 1974). For a brief, general treatment of informal marriage and related
institutions see Valeri, Informal Marriages and Other Curative Devices, 17 How. L.J.
558 (1972).
9. TEx. ATr'Y GEN. Op. No. H-503 (1974). Ch. 888, §§ 1, 1.05 [1969] Tex.
Laws 2707, 2711 allowed judicial waiver of "any information pertaining to an applicant,
other than the applicant's name, .

.

. for good cause shown ....

"

In TEX. Arr'y GEN. Op. No. H-581 (1975) the opinion was expressed that the county
clerk may issue a marriage license to a person within the thirty days following his or
her divorce for a marriage to be entered into after that time. Cf. TEX. ATr'Y GEN.
Op. No. M-604 (1970). See McKnight, Commentary to the Texas Family Code, Title
1, 5 TEx. TECH L. REV. 281, 286 (1974).
10. TEX. Arr'y GEN. Op. No. H-216 (1974).
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need of guidance. In answer to an inquiry" concerning the right of a married woman to use a name other than that of her husband for purposes of
public identification, record, and dealings, the attorney general stated that

to take the name of her husband or continue
at marriage a wife may choose
2
to use her former name.1
No case has yet reached an appellate Texas court with respect to the
spousal rights of the husband to consent to or interfere with a wife's medical
treatment concerning termination of pregnancy and related matters, though
the cases beginning to appear elsewhere tend to deny the husband's rights
in these matters.' 3 The courts, however, have dealt with some of the prob4
lems of status arising after marital dissolution. In one instance' the difficulties of claiming and proving liability for necessaries supplied during marriage
were exemplified. In another, though by way of obiter dictum, the Supreme
Court of Texas clearly indicated that Texas wives and Texas widows may
successfully bring suit for loss of consortium, 15 a conclusion that other jurisdictions have already reached. 16 The bar of interspousal immunity is still
of action that may be brought by one
maintained with respect to a cause
17
former spouse against the other. '
11. TEX. A'rr'Y GEN. RQ-420 (1973), from the Human Resources Committee of the
House of Representatives.
12. TEX. A'rr'v GEN. Op. No. H-432 (1974). The opinion does not consider the
possibility of choice of name unassociated with birth or marriage. Nor does it address
the possibility of a person's using one name for social purposes and another in business
or professional callings. See Comment, An Overview of the Equal Rights Amendment
in Texas, 11 Hous. L. REV. 136, 156 (1973). See also Petition of Hauptly, 312 N.E.2d
857 (Ind. 1974), with respect to the right of a married woman to formal name change
under TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 32.21 (1975). See Annot., 62 A.L.R.3d 1097 (1975).
13. See, e.g., Coe v. Gerstein, 376 F. Supp. 695 (S.D. Fla. 1974); Doe v. Doe, 314
N.E.2d 128 (Mass. 1974); Murray v. Vandevander, 522 P.2d 302 (Okla. Ct. App.
1974).
For the status of the Texas abortion law see TEX. A-r'xY GEN. Op. No. H-369 (1974).
See also Geduldeg v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974); Comment, Exclusion of Pregnancy
from Coverage of Disability Benefits Does Not Violate Equal Protection, 12 Hous. L.
REv. 488 (1975); Comment, Barefoot and Pregnant-Still: Equal Protection for
Women in Light of Geduldeg v. Aiello, 16 So. TEX. L. 'REv. 211 (1975). But cf. TEX.
Ai-r'Y GEN. Op. No. H-251 (1974).
14. Lutz v. Lutz, 508 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, no
writ).
15. Felsenthal v. McMillan, 493 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. 1973) noted in McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 66, 66-67 (1974).
16. See Duncan v. General Motors Corp., 499 F.2d 835 (10th Cir. 1974); Gonzalez
v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 385 F. Supp. 140 (D.P.R. 1974); Rodriguez v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 525 P.2d 669, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974); Tribble v. Gregory, 288 So. 2d 13 (Miss. 1974). But it was pointed out in Greenhurst v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 380 F. Supp. 638 (N.D. Ind. 1974), that recovery for loss of consortium
is not available under the Federal Employers Liability Act. But, like Texas, other states
generally adhere to the rule that a married woman cannot sue her husband for personal
injury caused by his tort prior to marriage. See, e.g., DiGirolamo v. Apanavage, 454
Pa. 557, 312 A.2d 382 (1974). Interestingly, the court held that the claim was not the
wife's "separate property" within the Pennsylvania Interspousal Immunity Statute,
though it would unquestionably be a wife's separate property under TEx. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 5.01 (1975) and TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15.
Though it mantains the rule that merely negligent infliction of mental anguish does
not give rise to a cause of action, the Supreme Court of Washington held that damages
for emotional distress may be recovered by an immediate family member when the defendant's conduct is "outrageous and extreme." Grimsby v. Samson, 85 Wash. 2d 52,
530 P.2d 291 (1975).
17. Latiolais v. Latiolais, 361 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1962, writ
ref'd n.r.e.). See also Burns v. Burns, 111 Ariz. 178, 526 P.2d 717 (1974), where the
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The increasing national divorce rate and the ever-increasing number of all
types of family law cases in the Texas courts suggest that the unfinished business of providing a properly integrated and coherent statewide family court
plan is well past due. Past efforts to bring all special domestic relations and
juvenile courts into the state system as fully fledged district courts's produced
a broadened jurisdiction for those separately created courts in several large
urban areas. 19 These efforts have not succeeded, however, in bringing within
the state system as regular district judges all of those judges who should
be elected in the manner of district judges, paid by the state, and entitled to
the pension benefits of the state system. Nor has uniformity been achieved
with regard to the powers of those separately created courts which are operated wholly or in part at local expense. 20 These incredibly overworked
courts are in desperate need of attention, but the problem cannot be solved
21
by the appointment of special masters to assist them.
Though strides have been made in institutionalizing the suggestion of counseling, 22 it seems to be generally agreed that the 1973 amendment to section
3.54 of the Family Code, providing that it is the responsibility of the petitioner's attorney to provide a printed notice concerning the availability of counseling, has been overburdensome and serves little useful purpose. The State
Bar of Texas has recommended repeal of subsections (a) and (b) of section
3.54.23 Though the language of the present statute seems mandatory, a failure in compliance does not negate jurisdiction to dissolve a marriage. 24 While
the notice provisions with respect to availability of counseling are regarded
as superfluous, it is widely agreed that the 1973 amendments clarifying the
privilege of the counselor's report are a sound addition to the Family Code. 25
The United State Supreme Court has concluded that a state's durational
court concluded that though divorce abrogates the doctrine of interspousal immunity insofar as intentional torts are concerned, the immunity should survive in cases involving
negligence. Otherwise spouses might be encouraged to obtain divorces on no-fault
grounds for the purpose of suit only.
18. See Raggio, Family DistrictCourts, 29 Tax. B.J. 1007 (1966).
19. See ch. 565, § 1, [1967] Tex. Laws 1242.
20. See, e.g., TEx. Arr'y GEN. Op. No. H-331 (1974) dealing with the limits of
jurisdiction of domestic relations court in Wharton County. See also TEX. ATr'y GEN.
Op.No. H-300 (1974).
21. See TEx. Arr'Y GEN. Op. No. H-609 (1975).

22. See TEx.

FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 3.54 (1975), enacted in 1968 and substantially

amended in 1973.
23. See Adams, Proposed Revisions of the Family Code, 37 TEx. B.J. 1159 (1974).
24. Ramirez v. Ramirez, No. 15357 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio, Dec. 4, 1974,
no writ). It was also concluded that a husband's showing that divorce had been contem-

plated for over twelve years and that reconciliation was impossible justified the court's
refusal to order counseling. Philp v. Philp, 516 S.W.2d 294 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1974, no writ).
25. In TEX. ATry GEN. OP. No. H-478 (1974) it was concluded that the coun-

selor's report was privileged and, absent effective waiver, should not be made available
to a federal agency.
In Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974),

the court refused a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit which
had approved the admission in evidence of conversations procured by the husband in

a divorce proceeding by means of a telephone tap of his wife's conversations.
In Smith v. Armstrong, 383 F. Supp. 365 (N.D. Tex. 1974), the court concluded that

it had jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) '(1974), to consider
the plaintiff's cause of action pertaining to conspiracy to interfere with civil rights by
way of, inter alia, coercing divorce.
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domicile requirement of one year for purposes of divorce is a reasonable re-

quirement within the United States Constitution.2 6 Subsequently, a threejudge federal district court sitting in New York upheld the constitutionality
of a New York statute which required that a petitioner married outside the
state maintain two years of residence prior to commencing divorce proceedings in New York. 27 The Texas Family Code 28 provides that a non-resident
spouse may petition for divorce in Texas if the other spouse has been domi-

ciled in Texas for six months. In LeFebvre v. LeFebvre29 Texas's ninety
days' county residence requirement30 was held immune from constitutional
8
attack. '
An obiter dictum in In re J'ackson32 may encourage the belief that the legislature intended to allow the granting of divorce on default of appearance
in spite of the provisions of section 3.53 of the Family Code which had been

thought adequate to deter this conclusion." On the other hand, as the result
of Dugie v. Dugie,8 4 many practitioners have begun to prepare statements
of fact in all divorce cases in which one of the parties has failed to appear.
In Dugie the husband made no appearance at the trial but appealed from
the decree of divorce. Since there was no statement of facts (to which the
appellant was entitled) and the court did not treat the husband's failure to
appear as a waiver of the presence of a court reporter, the appellate court
held that the husband was entitled to a new trial so that a record could be
5
made.8
26. Sosna v. Iowa, 95 S. Ct. 553, 42 L. Ed. 2d 532 (1975).

27. Mendez v. Heller, 380 F. Supp. 985 (E.D.N.Y. 1974). See also Mon Chi
Heung Au v. Lum, 512 F.2d 430 (9th Cir. 1975).
28. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.24 (1975).
29. 510 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1974, no writ).
30. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.20 (1975).
31. In a concurring opinion, Keith, J., expressed the view that the question had become moot prior to filing of the brief. 510 S.W.2d 29, 31 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1974, no writ). For an earlier discussion of the county residence requirements see McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 66, 69 (1974). In In
re Gilman, 507 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, writ dism'd), the court
once again held that a failure to honor the sixty days waiting period between filing of
a divorce petition and judgment is not jurisdictional.
32. 506 S.W.2d 261, 269 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, writ dism'd). See also
Leonard v. Leonard, 512 S.W.2d 771, 776 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, writ
dism'd).
33. In Friedman v. Friedman, 233 Ga. 254, 210 So. 2d 754 (1974), the court held
that a divorce might be granted without any evidentiary hearing whatever when both
parties allege the marriage had been "irretrievably broken" since there was no fact issue
then remaining for adjudication and neither party could complain of a judgment he or
she had sought. Though it has been suggested that both spouses might be petitioners
in a Texas proceeding utilizing no-fault grounds, McKnight, Commentary to the Texas
Family Code, Title 1, 5 TEX. TECt L. REv. 281, 328 (1974), the Texas Family Code
nowhere specifically provides for joint petitioners. Observations there made with respect
to Cusack v. Cusack, 491 S.W.2d 714 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, writ
dism'd) may fuel this misinterpretation. There it was said that "as a no-fault ground
for divorce, insupportability is not subject to any defenses in the nature of affirmative
defenses, for example, adultery, recrimination, connivance, collusion and condonation."
5 TEX. TECH L. REV. at 328. That statement was not meant to suggest that a respondent's denial of a petitioner's grounds for divorce be construed as a "defense" to
which the ground of insupportability is not susceptible. Such a position would constitute
denial of due process.
34. 511 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, no writ).
35. Cf. Brown v. Brown, 520 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1975, no writ).
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With respect to temporary orders the court held in Ex parte Thompson "6
that an order for temporary alimony is effective only to the date of the judgment appealed from and that a further order must be obtained for support
pending appeal. Unless a pre-judgment alimony order expressly requires the
continuation of payments after judgment and until further proceedings are

concluded, a further order after judgment (or on granting a new trial) is necessary in order that the party charged with support may be specifically apprised of a continuing obligation. An order granting a new trial does not
automatically continue temporary alimony or make it applicable retroactively

37
to the period after the entry of a divorce decree. In Dickson v. Dickson
the trial court had entered a temporary order under section 3.58 of the Family Code dividing the management of two farms between the spouses. An
appeal was taken from the order though no injunctive relief had been sought
by either party. The Austin court of civil appeals held that the order was

not subject to appeal under article 466238 which authorizes appeals from orders granting temporary injunctions. On the other hand, in Spiller v. Sherill 9
the trial court granted a divorce and entered an agreed interlocutory decree

imposing a trust on particular property, and gave the wife its exclusive use
pending final judgment. Subsequently, the court entered its final judgment
dissolving the trust and awarding the property to the husband. The wife perfected her appeal and filed her supersedeas bond. She then sought a writ

of prohibition to maintain the state of affairs under the interlocutory decree.
The writ was granted. It was concluded that there was a final appealable
judgment, and by filing the supersedeas bond, execution on the judgment was
40
stayed.
When the husband filed his petition for divorce in Deen v. Kirk,41 he also
filed the wife's waiver of citation executed the day before suit was filed, and
36. 510 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ).
37. 516 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974, no writ).
38. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4662 (1940).
39. 518 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, no writ).
40. In Thompson v. Gibbs, 504 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974), a writ
of mandamus was sought and conditionally granted to order the trial judge to proceed
to trial in a suit for divorce which he had removed from his docket. A decree of divorce
was entered on June 15 and ten days later the wife filed a motion for new trial which
was timely amended on July 16. On August 13 the parties entered into an agreement
to extend the time of hearing until September 6, when the judge set aside the decree
of June 15 and granted a new trial. More than two months later the judge entered an
order setting aside his order of September 6 and removing the case from the docket on
the ground that the granting of a motion for new trial on September 6 was rendered
after the motion had been overruled by operation of law as made more than 30 days
after the original decree. The parties did not dispute that their agreement had been ineffective to extend the time for decision of the amended motion for retrial and that the
amended motion was overruled by operation of law 45 days after it had been filed and
all of these events occurred prior to the hearing on September 6. The wife contended,
however, that the trial court was vested with authority for a period of 30 days following
the overruling of the motion for new trial to change the decree so that the order of September 6 was valid and effective and, hence, the court's subsequent striking of its order
of September 6 was ineffective. The Dallas court of civil appeals agreed with the petitioner's contention that the ultimate order should be disregarded and that the cause
should be regarded as pending before the trial court.
Thereafter, the Supreme Court of Texas overruled the motion to file a petition for
a writ of mandamus. Thompson v. Gibbs, 17 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 226 (1974).
41. 508 S.W.2d 70 (Tex. 1974).
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it was, therefore, ineffective under article 2224.42 The suit went to judgment
without personal service of the wife. The wife then brought a bill of review
as a separate suit to set aside the divorce decree. More than thirty days after
rendition of the judgment, the trial court set aside the judgment in the first
suit, presumably as void on the record. The husband then moved for dismissal of the second suit on the ground of mootness since the judgment in
the first suit had been set aside. The husband's motion was granted. While
the wife's appeal of the court's order was pending, she brought an original
mandamus proceeding in the Texas Supreme Court to expunge the order
which purported to set aside the original judgment. The relief sought by the
wife was, in effect, granted. 43 Her appeal thereafter succeeded on her suit
for a bill of review. 44 In another case for a bill of review the members of
the appellate court took very different views of the pleadings, the record, the
applicable law, and its application. 45 The ex-wife had been the petitioner
for the divorce entered upon an agreed judgment. She brought a bill of review to set aside all matters relating to child custody and division of property,
but not the divorce itself. Her contention was that her participation in the
proceeding by way of an agreed judgment had been procured by the husband's fraudulent misrepresentations. A majority of the appellate court was
of the opinion that the wife's bill of review should have been granted. The
dissenting judge discerned fraud and negligence on her part. 46 No point was
made with respect to the extent that the wife acted on the advice of counsel
during her negotiations with her husband.
Law v. Law47 was an appeal by the ex-wife from a judgment for divorce
in a proceeding which she initiated, but the appeal was only with respect to
the division of property. The parties had agreed to an equal division of a
community interest in a particular piece of property, but the judgment had
mistakenly awarded it solely to the wife. The husband moved to correct the
judgment. 48 Within thirty days of entry of the judgment, the court entered
an amended judgment that changed the division of property. 49 The wife's
attorney was advised of the hearing of the husband's motion to amend, but
the wife's counsel did not appear. The appellate court rejected the wife's
42. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2224 (1971).

43. The relief was granted conditionally if the trial judge should fail to set aside
his order.
44. Deen V.Deen, 511 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1974, no writ).
45. McFarland v. Reynolds, 513 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974,
no writ).
46. 513 S.W.2d at 628. See also Boley v. Boley, 506 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. Civ. App.Fort Worth 1974, no writ).
47. 517 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974, no writ).
48. A somewhat similar situation was presented in Holway v. Holway, 506 S.W.2d
643 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1974, no writ), where a judgment was entered nunc pro
tunc to correct a clerical error six years after the original entry of judgment. The issue
there was whether the later judgment was fully supported by the judge's handwritten entry on his docket sheet.
49. But if a spouse against whom an amended judgment is sought to be entered
would have been entitled to plead the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act by virtue
of intervening military orders, the court would err in entering an amended judgment.
Becknell v. D'Angelo, 506 S.W.2d 688 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1974, no writ).
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assertion of lack of proper notice of the hearing under rules 316 and 317.50
The wife also alleged irregularities in a previous divorce of the spouses after
which they had remarried. 5 1 In so doing she sought to reopen the property
settlement confirmed by the earlier decree. The wife asserted that the judgment merely stated that the marriage was dissolved and was irregular in that
it did not state for and against whom it was rendered in compliance with
rule 306.52 But it was clear from the record that the wife was the moving
party in the suit. The court leaves the implication that a simple declaration
compliance with the Family Code when no-fault
of dissolution is in proper
53
grounds are relied on.
Mitchim v. Mitchim5 4 is a landmark of domestic relations in the conflict
of laws. Arizona had been the marital domicile of the spouses for about five
years before the husband moved to Texas. A year later the wife commenced
divorce proceedings in Arizona, which had adopted a long-arm statute with
the purpose of giving residents of that state "the maximum privileges permitted by the Constitution of the United States." 55 The husband was cited in
Texas as provided in the statute for extraterritorial service. Without any further showing of personal jurisdiction, the Arizona court granted the wife a
divorce and awarded her an order for alimony, costs, and attorney's fees.
The husband sought a declaration of a Texas court that the order for alimony,
costs, and attorney's fees was void. Recognizing "that judgments for future
payments of alimony and judgments otherwise subject to modification have
'no constitutional claim to a more conclusive or final effect' in another state
than they have in the state where rendered," 56 the Texas Supreme Court held
that the Arizona decree for delinquent alimony payments would be worthy
of full faith and credit, and that the Texas trial court erred in adjudicating
the Arizona decree as void. A Texas court is bound by Arizona's construction of her long-arm statute. If other states which have not done so enact
long-arm statutes similar to Arizona's, and if those statutes are elsewhere
given the effect that Texas gives to the Arizona statute, many of the difficulties we now attempt to solve so haltingly and inadequately by recourse to
the reciprocal child support acts will be soluble by simpler means, made
easier still by a widespread enactment of the 'Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act.
50. TEX. R. Civ. P. 316, 317, 329b. For other suggestions of professional misconduct see Leonard v. Leonard, 512 S.W.2d 771 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974,
writ dism'd); Blancas v. Blancas, 495 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1973,
no writ).

See also McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J.

66, 70 (1974).
51. In Smith v. Smith, 5,19 S.W.2d 152 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, writ ref'd),
the court held that a divorce of the spouses followed by their remarriage does not invoke
TEX. PROD. CODE ANN. § 69 (1956) which causes testamentary provisions for a divorced
spouse to become ineffective.
52. TEx. R. Civ. P. 306.
53. See also Blancas v. Blancas, 495 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1973,

no writ).
54. 518 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. 1975).
55. Id. at 365, citing Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 100 Ariz. 251, 413
P.2d 732 (1966).
56. id. at 366, citing Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S, 610 (1946).
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Characterizationof MaritalProperty

The basic rules of characterization are simply stated: (1) property acquired before marriage or representing an element of the person or personality of a spouse brought into marriage is separate property; (2) property
acquired during marriage is presumed to be community property, but this
presumption may be disproved by showing (a) acquisition by gift or inheri57
tance, or (b) mutation of separate property demonstrated by tracing.
However, these simple rules are not always easy of application.
Section 5.01 of the Family Code 8 enunciates the rule that recovery for
personal injury if it is not measured by loss of earning power is separate property. Once that proposition was accepted as constitutional, 9 various peripheral points related to it have come before the courts for resolution. In Wilkinson v. Stevison6 ° the Supreme Court of Texas concluded that a husband's
contributory negligence bars a wife's recovery for separate property injuries
if he is acting as her agent in the venture in which she is injured, a proposition so obvious as not to merit discussion even though the supreme court's
attention was required to apply the rule to particular facts. 61 But characterization of a percentage of military retirement benefits as "disability payments" does not alter their essential community character as retirement benefits. 62 An unvested interest in military pension benefits of whatever nature
is not capable of characterization as matrimonial property, however. 63
Characterization is most easily demonstrated by the application of presumptions and by tracing. If, for example, part of a tract of land is brought
into marriage and the rest is acquired during marriage, the latter part is presumed to be community.6 4 But if property bought during marriage is shown
57. For a collection of cases see Comment, The Commingling of Separate and Community Funds: The Requirement of Tracing in Texas, 6 ST. MARY'S L.J. 234 (1974).
58. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.01 (1975).
59. Graham v. Franco, 488 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. 1972), discussed in McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 27, 27-29 (1973); Smith,
Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 45, 53-55 (1973). See also McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 66, 71-72 (1974); Comment, Reclassification of Tort Recoveries by Spouses-Possible Effect of Graham v.
Franco,4 Tax. TECH L. REV. 359 (1973).
60. 514 S.W.2d 895 (Tex. 1974).
61. The facts of Sutherland v. Auch Inter-Burrough Transit Co., 366 F. Supp. 127
(E.D. Pa. 1973), suggest some further questions as yet unresolved by Texas appellate
courts. That was a case in which pain and suffering affected earning power.
62. Marshall v. Marshall, 511 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1974, no writ); cf. Ramsey v. Ramsey, 474 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1971,
writ dism'd), discussed in McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas
law, 27 Sw. L.J. 27, 31 (1973). See also Busby v. Busby, 457 S.W.2d 551, 554 (Tex.
1970).
63. Lumpkins v. Lumpkins, 519 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, no
writ). See also Note, Rice Acreage Allotment, 26 BAYLOR L. REv. 376 (1974).
The Pension Reform Act of 1974 may have considerable impact on the characterization of property interests in employee retirement plans through its provision that its
terms supersede any and all state law insofar as it may now or hereafter relate to
an employee benefit plan therein described. Federal government and church plans are,
however, excluded from the operation of the act. See Ray, Trusts and Pensions (including effects of the Pension Reform Act of 1974), in TExAs FAMLY LAW & COMMUNITY
PROPERTY 183 (J. McKnight ed. 1975).
64. Cockerham v. Cockerham, 514 S.W.2d 150 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1974, writ
granted).
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as purchased with the proceeds of an inheritance, the presumption in favor
of acquisition in favor of the community is rebutted.65 In Babb v. McGee66
the dispute centered upon characterization of property conveyed by a husband to his wife for "$10.00 and love and affections." The recital of the
small dollar amount would not in itself negate a showing of intended gift by
the husband to the wife, but other recitals indicating a transfer wholly or preponderantly for valuable consideration may lead to that implication.6 7
Characterizing a credit purchase is in a sense a matter of tracing: the
property acquired and the liability incurred are characterized by the nature
of the terms of credit on which the transaction is based. A recent example
of this principle is Ray v. United States.68 There it was clear that the agreement between lender and borrower provided that the loan should be repaid
from the separate property of the borrowing spouse. The proceeds of the
loan were used to purchase United States treasury bonds which the estate
of the deceased spouse redeemed at face value in payment of estate taxes.
In an action for refund of estate taxes the United States questioned the propriety of redemption of the bonds. The court concluded that the bond redemption was indeed proper as the bonds were the separate estate of the deceased spouse, not the community estate of both spouses.6 9
Currie v. Currie70 dealt with the character of income from two trusts of
which a spouse was beneficiary. In one the net income of the trust was to
become part of the corpus subject to the full discretion of the trustee to determine what constituted the net income. The trustee was also empowered to
pay estate taxes on the estate of the settlor from the income and corpus of
the trust, as well as current expenses of the trust. The trustee had done so,
and the principal argument advanced by the beneficiary's spouse was that
their community estate was entitled to reimbursement for those funds expended. The court held that those payments were made before any interest
would accrue to the beneficiary and, hence, there was no community interest
in them. In the other trust the spouse was beneficiary of one-third of the
corpus of the trust to be distributed on the death of the spouse's mother, to
whom the net income of the trust was to be paid in the trustee's discretion
65. Cowart v. Cowart, 515 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1974, writ ref'd
n.r.e).
66. 507 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
67. See, e.g., Scaling v. Beggs, 334 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1960,

writ ref'd n.r.e.), where the deed recited "in consideration of Ten Dollars and other valuable considerations."
Though Texas law may not always lend itself to easy application in complicated fact

situations, the precision of our constitutional and statutory definitions nevertheless precludes uncertainty of titles and what may be regarded as characterization of separate
or community property merely by post facto imagination of a spouse or whim of the
courts. See, e.g., Kroloff v. United States, 487 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1973). See also Bing-

aman, The Effects of an Equal Rights Amendment on the New Mexico System of Community Property: Problems of Characterization, Management and Control, 3 NEw
MEXIco L. REV. 11 (1973).
68. 385 F.Supp. 372 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
69. For an analysis of statutory law with respect to post mortem liability, see Hudspeth, Texas Marital Property Laws as They Relate to Estate Administration, 36 TEX.
B.J. 293 (1973).
70. 518 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ dism'd).

1975]

FAMILY LAW

during her lifetime. Any undistributed net income was to be added to the
corpus. The court held that accumulated net income was not community
property of the "contingent" remainderman.

But as a general rule, the right

of this beneficiary would be said to be vested subject to divestiture for failure
to survive the life tenant.
It has long been disputed whether a partition agreement by which the community property is divided between the spouses as shares of separate property

can properly cover after-acquired income which, absent the agreement, would
have been community property during the marriage. Such partitions are fre-

quently in terms of separation agreements, though they need not be made
72
in that context.71

With the decision in Amarillo National Bank v. Liston

authorities were equally divided: two decisions of courts of civil appeals favoring prospective partition and two opposing. Jernigan v. Scott 73 gives the
proponents of prospective partition the edge.74 Substantially the same issue
must be dealt with in considering the validity of provisions in a marriage contract which has the objective of dealing with earnings acquired during marriage.

75

C.

Division on Divorce

In Francis v. Francis76 the Texas Supreme Court held that a contractual
property settlement enforceable as such, though "approved" by the trial court
and incorporated in the divorce decree, does not constitute an award of permanent alimony. For reasons unaccountable, but perhaps explainable by
slowness of legal communications or simply by hope, the issue there settled
continues to be litigated on appeal. 77 In Mahrer v. Mahrer78 a broad inter71. See, e.g., Strickland v. Wester, 131 Tex. 23, 112 S.W.2d 1047 (1938); Cauble
v. Beaver-Electra Ref. Co., 115 Tex. 1, 274 S.W. 120 (1925).
72. 464 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.), discussed
in McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 25 Sw. L.J. 31, 32
(1971), where other related cases are cited.
73. 518 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, error ref'd n.r.e.).
74. Cortez v. Corsi, 513 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, writ
ref'd n.r.e.), also deals peripherally with the consequences of a property settlement
agreement. See also Costello v. Costello, 379 F. Supp. 630 (D.Wyo. 1974).
75. Since parties to antenuptial agreements may move from state to state, it is advisable to consider the law of prospective domicile in drawing them. A useful addition
to the literature on this subject is Winston, Antenuptial Agreements-What the Law
Now Says, 62 ILL. B.J. 604 (1974).
In a later chapter of the Rosensteil dispute, Rosensteil v. Rosensteil, 368 F. Supp. 61
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), a sequel to Rosensteil v. Rosensteil, 16 N.Y.2d 64, 209 N.E.2d 709,
262 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 971 (1966), in which New York finally
came around to approving foreign bilateral divorces, it was asserted that an antenuptial
agreement between prospective spouses by which the woman gave up all interest in the
husband's estate on termination of the marriage by divorce was not binding on her following an ex parte foreign divorce proceeding by the husband in a new jurisdiction of
domicile. The court held that the agreement was fully binding on the ex-wife and her
contentions With respect to misunderstanding some of its provisions were cured by her
representation by counsel in its formulation.
76. 412 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. 1967).
77. See Tinsley v. Tinsley, 512 S.W.2d 74 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1974, no writ);
Shaw v. Shaw, 483 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1972, no writ). Nor
is. Francis fully understood by the judiciary. See Strader v. Strader, 517 S.W.2d 905
(Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1974, no writ). See also In re Jackson, 506 S.W.2d 261 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, writ dism'd).
. 78. 510-S.W.2d 402 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ).
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pretation of consideration supporting such a contract was again made. 79 Nor
is an award of a money judgment to one of the spouses to equalize the division of property on divorce a decree for permanent alimony. 0 Even if the
parties in their property settlement agreement describe the payments as "alimony" so that the husband may claim them as tax deductions, payments ordered by the decree in furtherance of the contract do not constitute forbidden
8
permanent alimony. '
In the same sense that an interest in a pension fund, or any other interest
not vested during marriage, cannot be a community property interest subject
to division on divorce, 8 2 the court concluded in In re Rister8 that a vested
pension right subject to increase in amount based on the employee-spouse's
continued employment after divorce does not allow the divorce court to consider the interest as worth more than its accrued value at the date of divorce.
If rights in a pension plan are vested from the moment of employment, as

the court suggested they might have been in the pension plan considered in
Rister, some of the difficult problems of division on divorce or post-divorce

divisions of assets undivided in the divorce decree, as in Dessommes v. Dessommes,8 4 are not presented for resolution. A thorough understanding of the
Pension Reform Act of 1974 may also cause some problems of pension division on divorce to disappear.8 5
The general rule of property division on divorce in Texas is that of equity
-as "the court deems just and right."86 The court arrives at this conclusion
79. For further discussion of this point, see McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 27, 37 (1973).
80. In re Jackson, 506 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, writ dism'd).
As to enforcement of such lump sum or periodic payments, see Forney v. Jorrie, 511
S.W.2d 379, 383 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
81. Nordstrom v. Nordstrom, 515 S.W.2d 14 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1974, writ
ref'd n.r.e.). For another situation in which tax considerations were involved in the interpretation of a property settlement agreement, see Motheral v. Motheral, 514 S.W.2d
475 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.). For a somewhat polemical appeal for statutory authorization of permanent alimony for ex-wives, see Turley,
A Wife's Right to Support Payments in Texas, 16 So. TEx. L.J. 1 (1974). At its February 1975 meeting the Board of Directors of the State Bar of Texas rejected a proposal
that the bar sponsor legislation providing for post-divorce alimony of limited duration
as a "readjustment allowance" but approved the entering wedge to the same end, a proposal for a disability allowance for a divorced spouse.
82. Lumpkins v. Lumpkins, 519 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, no
writ); Davis v. Davis, 495 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, writ dism'd), discussed in McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 SW. L.J. 66, 73
(1974). See also Comment, Retirement Benefits and the Right of Reimbursement, 11
Ious. L.REV. 960 (1974).
83. 512 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ).
84. 505 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.), discussed in
McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 66, 72-73 (1974).
See also Rudberg, Enforcing Divorce Judgments and Property Settlement Agreements in
Texas, 5 TEX. TECH L. REV. 645, 649 (1974).
85. See Ray, supra note 63. Federal and religious pension plans are, however, excluded from the operation of that act.
86. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63 (1975). The section concludes with the words
"having due regard for the rights of each party and any children of the marriage." The
reference to the rights of children is an anachronism, perhaps the last vestige of the
forced heirship statute, An Act Concerning Wills §§ 13-15, [1840] Tex. Laws 167, 170,
2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 341, 344 (1898), repealed in 1856, but in effect when
Texas's first divorce law was enacted, An Act Concerning Divorce and Alimony § 4,
[1841] Tex. Laws 20, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 483, 484 (1898), as a part of
which the original version of § 3.63 was enacted. At that time, therefore, children had
rights in the property of their parents which could not be divested by marriage contracts
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by proper exercise of its discretion,17 and a jury verdict on division of property is purely advisory."' There is no requirement that property be divided
equally, or in kind, though an equitable division may be achieved by awarding particular properties to one spouse and property of a different quality to
the other,8 9 or by requiring one spouse to execute a note in favor of the other
to achieve a balanced division if one spouse is given all or substantially all
of the property in esse,90 or all of a particular type of property, 91 or by granting a money award secured by a lien on particular property awarded to the

other spouse,92 or by ordering periodic payments for the same purpose. 8
In approaching the problem of property division on divorce, the court will
commonly make a finding as to the character of particular property as either
separate or community estate. If a mistake is made in the characterization,
but the division is nonetheless equitable, the courts have treated the mistake
as harmless.9 4 If the issue is merely one of the trial court's exercise of dis-

cretion, the division will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that
95
the court abused its discretion by making a manifestly unfair division.
There is still some dispute with respect to the meaning, apart from the wis97
dom,9 6 of section 3.63 of the Family Code. But in Wilkerson v. Wilkerson

the court made a clear holding that title to separate realty might be divested
in making an equitable division on divorce. In Bell v. Bell98 the Beaumont
court of civil appeals had held that in making a division on divorce the court
must take into consideration separate corporate interests as well as community property. The appellate court seems to have concluded that the trial
or disinheritance without cause, but today children have no such rights but merely a

right of support under title 2 of the Family Code. See McKnight, Commentary on the
Texas Family Code, Title 1, 5 TEx. TEcH L. REV. 281, 340 (1974).
87. Wetzel v. Wetzel, 514 S.W.2d 283 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1974, no
88. Cockerham v. Cockerham, 514 S.W.2d 150 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1974, writ

granted), though the court's conclusion that a jury finding of fact with respect to disposal of marital property as also purely advisory seems erroneous.
89. See Mercer v. Mercer, 503 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1973,
no writ).
90. Womble v. Womble, 502 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1973, no
writ).
91. Elrod v. Elrod, 517 S.W.2d 669 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, no
writ).
92. In re Jackson, 506 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, writ dism'd).
93. Forney v. Jorrie, 511 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ ref'd
n.r.e.). But acceleration of payments on breach was not there considered because not
supported by proper pleadings. For another instance of inadequate pleadings to support
a division on divorce, see Townsend v. Townsend, 511 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1974, no writ).
94. Law v. Law, 517 S.W.2d 379, 383 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974, writ dism'd);
Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, 515 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, no writ); Gaulding v. Gaulding, 503 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1973, no writ).
95. Bell v. Bell, 513 S.W.2d 20 (Tex. 1974); Elrod v. Elrod, 517 S.W.2d 669 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, no writ); Cunningham v. Cunningham, 515 S.W.2d
345 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, no writ); Hensley v. Hensley, 496 S.W.2d
929 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1973, no writ). If the last case stands for any other
proposition, it is difficult to discern.
96. At the 1975 regular session of the Texas Legislature, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 454 to prohibit divestiture of title to separate realty by a divorce court.
97. 515 S.W.2d 52, 55-57 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, no writ). For an earlier
discussion of the point see McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 27, 38-39 (1973). See also McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey
of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 66, 75 nn. 64-65 (1974).
98. 504 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1974).
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court failed to consider the separate corporate interests, thus it reversed and
remanded for further proceedings, but without any direction as to how division should be made. The court merely commented that in the interest of
equity it should make no difference whether the wealth accumulated through
the activity of one spouse was earned by doing business as an individual proprietorship or through a corporation. 9 In reversing the conclusion of the
court of civil appeals and affirming the judgment of the trial court, the Supreme Court of Texas merely concluded that the trial court had considered
all the business interests of the parties in making its division. 10 0
In Cooper v. Cooper'0 ' the court had before it a case involving a considerable amount of community property as well as substantial separate estates
belonging to each of the spouses. Though the differences in earning capacity
and business opportunities of the spouses justified an unequal division of the
community estate, there were no circumstances 102 requiring "an apportionment of the husband's separate property to the wife in order to effect a fair
and just division of the estates of the parties. .

.

. The separate property

of one spouse should not be awarded to the other merely to equalize their
comparative wealth."'10 3 The court ordered remission of items of the husband's separate property awarded the wife and on compliance affirmed the
rest of the trial court's award.
No appellate court has yet considered whether a distinction should be
drawn between fault and no-fault divorces with respect to taking fault into
consideration in making a division of property. 10 4 In making a property division in both instances the courts frequently recite the old litany of factors,
including fault, to be considered in making a discretionary property division. 10 5 It is submitted that courts should not automatically apply factors
of fault in dividing property in a divorce based on no-fault grounds. 106
Fixing an attorney's fee is closely related to a division of property though
the underlying reason for doing so may be juridically unrelated. Liability
for the attorney's fee of the petitioning or responding wife in a matrimonial
cause has long fallen on the husband and any property over which he has
control has been regarded as subject to its satisfaction. Hence, responsibility
for payment of the fee rests not only on the community subject to his charge
but on his present and future separate estate. In Family Code terms liability
for the fee is, therefore, rooted in the duty of support the husband owes to
99. Id. at 611.
100. Bell v. Bell, 513 S.W.2d 20 (Tex. 1974).
101. 513 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, no writ).
102. As when one party is without means of support or has children to support, as
pointed out in Fuhrman v. Fuhrman, 302 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1957,
writ dism'd).
103. Id. at 234.
104. The question was posed in McKnight & Raggio, Family Law, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 25 Sw. L.J. 34, 42-43 (1972).
105. See Cooper v. Cooper, 513 S.W.2d 229, 233, 234 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1974, no writ).
106. See the series of comments culminating in Sassower, No-Fault Divorce and
Women's Property Rights: A Rebuttal, 45 N.Y.S.B.J. 485 (1973). See also McKnight,
MatrimonialProperty, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 27, 36-37 (1973).
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the wife.107 The reason for this result is found in classifying the wife's attorney's fee as a necessary of the marriage. But the principle that the responsibility for providing necessaries produces personal liability of the husband as
well as a community one' 0 8 was established when the husband had control
of the whole community as well as both separate estates. In that context
the principle that the wife constituted the husband's agent of necessity for
procuring necessaries was reasonable.10 9 The husband's liability for necessaries was a corollary to the common law rule that a married woman did
not have an independent contractual capacity or property subject to her control. In order to carry out her function as manager of the household, it was
necessary that a married woman should be able to pledge the husband's credit
for those things which were required. Now, however, in a changed statutory
environment with respect to community management, the courts' blind adherence to the necessaries rule is not appropriate, especially when it operates
for the benefit of a moneyed petitioner in a no-fault situation where the respondent spouse opposes the divorce. The no-fault concept allows each
spouse to dissolve the marriage without any meaningful restraint by the other.
In that instance it would be appropriate to require a petitioning spouse to
pay for legal assistance in achieving the unilateral objectives desired.
In Cooper v. Cooper1 0 both parties had substantial separate estates and
there was also a substantial community estate. The court concluded that
there was no justification for charging the wife's attorney's fees against the
husband's estate. "In dividing the community property, particularly in 'nofault' cases, the trial court should also consider the fact that the husband will
be liable for [his own] attorney's fees.""' If, however, the wife's attorney's
fees, incurred in the divorce proceeding, are properly viewed as necessaries,
and the community estate is to be equally divided, it would seem appropriate
that both spouses' attorneys' fees be paid from the community estate as a
cost of winding up the marriage before the residue of the community is divided. But the courts have customarily looked upon the wife's attorney's fees
as an independent element of equitable division of the estate of the parties
with the result that the husband is ordered to pay the fees, or they are ordered to be paid from that part of the community property which would
otherwise be distributed to him.
The attorney's fee awarded to one spouse against the other must be reasonable.1 2 Reasonableness of an attorney's fee is a question of fact and evi107. TEX. FAM.

CODE ANN.

§ 4.02 (1975).

108. in re Jackson, 506 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, writ dism'd).
109. In its current context, however, the result is that the wife is given several management of that community property over which the husband has sole management for

the purpose of procuring necessaries, including the cost of professional representation
in a divorce proceeding.
110. 513 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1974, no writ).
111. Id. at 235.
112. Since necessaries provided to a married woman used to be treated as contracted
for by her as her husband's agent of necessity, the wife's attorney's fee was fixed in a
reasonable amount in order to protect the principal from any imposition that may have
been perpetrated on his agent.

The judicial determination of a reasonable amount under

present law, however, seems to be for the purpose of making an equitable division of
the marital property.
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dence must be introduced to support the finding. It is not appropriate for
the court merely to take judicial notice of minimum fee schedules, or the
judge's personal experience in such matters, without hearing some evidence
to support the finding. 113 Fees for appraisers, actuaries, accountants, and
other expert witnesses called by the wife are aspects of her attorney's fee.'

The Ethics Committee of the State Bar of Texas has expressed the opinion' 15 that it is improper for a lawyer to secure a judgment for legal fees
against his client in the same suit as that in which he is representing that
client.1 1 6 The opinion points up the appropriateness of an attorney's reaching an early understanding with his client with respect to fees, and a full disclosure of these arrangements will facilitate the court's fixing of fees. For
the purpose of fee disputes the courts have sometimes treated 1 7 an attorney
for a client-spouse as a party to the client's suit against the other spouse in
a domestic matter without any formal designation of the attorney as a party
to the suit. Masters v. Stair,"" the most recent case on the subject, twice
reached the San Antonio court of civil appeals. The attorney had been employed by the wife, who promised to pay him a reasonable fee for representing her in a divorce proceeding though no understanding was reached as to
a precise amount. The trial court found that a reasonable fee for representation of the wife was $4,800 but awarded the attorney a judgment of $2,500
against the husband for his fee. The ex-husband paid that amount. In his
subsequent suit against his former client for the rest of the fee the trial court
concluded that the divorce judgment was a bar to the attorney's recovery.
But the attorney seemed to have argued that he was not a party to the suit
for divorce. Though questioning the ethical propriety of some of the consequences of doing so, the appellate court seemed willing to treat the attorney
as a party, but was unable to resolve the dispute on the basis of the record
before it." 9 On further appeal after a new trial at which all the foregoing
facts were found, the appellate court held that the attorney was properly entitled to recover the difference between the amount found as a reasonable fee
and the amount already paid by the husband under the judicial order. 120 In
113. Huntley v. Huntley, 512 S.W.2d 767 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974, no writ).
In Reaney v. Reaney, 505 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ), there was
presumably evidence in the record sustaining the value of the attorney's time and services. See also Ramirez v. Ramirez, No. 15357 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio, Dec. 4,
1974, no writ). For a general discussion, see Annot., 59 A.L.R.3d 152 (1974).
114. Currie v. Currie, 518 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ
dism'd). For a receiver's fee and salary, see Huntley v. Huntley, 512 S.W.2d 767 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1974, no writ).
115. TEx. ETHICS COMM. Op. No. 374, 37 TEx. B.J. 1085 (1974).
116. For a general discussion of other matters in the attorney-client relationship, see
D. GRANT, AVOIDING UNINTENTIONAL GIEVANCES (1974), reprinted in part in 37 Tax.
B.J. 959, 1081, 1175 (1974); 38 TEx. B.J. 55, 155 (1975).
117. See Mullinax, Wells, Mauzy & Collins v. Dawson, 478 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); cf. Carter v. Leiter, 476 S.W.2d 461 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.), where the attorneys intervened as parties. Both
cases are discussed in McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law,
27 Sw. L.J. 27, 40 (1973).
118. 505 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio), rev'd and remanded, 518
S.W.2d 439 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1974, no writ).
119. 505 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1974).
120. 518 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, no writ).
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Myers v. Myers12 1 the wife executed a release to her ex-husband purporting
to discharge his obligation to pay her attorney's fees as required by court
order. After the husband's unsuccessful appeal of the cause, the trial judge
ordered the clerk to pay the wife's attorney's fees out of the husband's cash
deposit as a supersedeas bond. The husband's appeal of this interlocutory
order was unsuccessful.

1 22

Special care must always be taken in drawing a divorce decree so that the
understanding of the parties' intentions are fully and unambiguously expressed to insure that enforcement can be effectively achieved either by contempt or for a money judgment. Particular care should be taken in spelling
out responsibility for discharging tax liabilities of former spouses. A recital
that one spouse must pay "community debts" will not necessarily cover tax
liabilities of both spouses during the last year of marriage. 123 Nor should
it be anticipated that a dispute arising from a property settlement agreement
by which each spouse undertakes responsibility for his or her income taxes
can be resolved by a suit for injunctive relief brought by one spouse against
the federal taxing authorities.12 4 The draftsman of a divorce decree should
also anticipate the discharge of some liability for a former spouse by a third
person.' 25 The tax consequences of buy-out agreements between the spouses
dehors the decree must also be carefully weighed. A tax court has recently
held, for example,'1 8 that an agreement between spouses by which the husband would borrow money to buy out the wife's interest in the community
home would cause her to realize a long-term capital gain on the transaction.
The prospect of need for enforcement by contempt proceedings should always be envisioned in drafting the decree. The court's order must be stated
in clear and specific terms before a party can be found in contempt for its
violation. 12 7 In Marshall v. Marshall12s the divorce court properly constituted an ex-husband a constructive trustee of a percentage of his military retirement payments "as, and when received" and ordered him to pay those
amounts to the ex-wife. 12 This has been a popular device to cope with the
difficulties in dividing federal retirement benefits with respect to which the
121. 515 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1974, writ dism'd). An
earlier aspect of this dispute is noted in McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 66, 77 (1974).
122. The husband's petition for mandamus was not properly filed. For that and
other reasons, the writ of mandamus was denied.
123. Brooks v. Brooks, 515 S.W.2d 730 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1974, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
124. Lange v. Phinney, 507 F.2d 1000 (5th Cir. 1975).
125. See Forney v. Jorrie, 511 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ
ref'd n.r.e.), where the wife's second husband discharged liabilities of both former
spouses.
126. Jean L. May, 33 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 256 (1974).
127. See Ex parte Filemyr, 509 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974, no writ).
See also Ex parte Thompson, 510 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ).
An order to pay interest on late payments to the ex-wife's accruing share of property
is not enforceable by contempt. Ex parte Sutherland, 515 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Texarkana 1974, writ dism'd).
128. 511 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, no writ).
129. id. at 75. An unappealed order with respect to characterization and division of
retirement pay cannot be attacked by a writ of habeas corpus. Ex parte Sutherland,
515 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1974, writ dism'd).
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United States has been uncooperative. 130 Short of recourse to the federal
courts by the state, which may be achieved by administrative intercession of
the federal Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the recently enacted Social Service Amendments of 1974 do not offer Texas more than federal assistance to find former spouses who are delinquent in compliance with
court orders. Garnishment of wages from federal sources does not seem
available because that remedy is dependent on its availability under state
3
law.1 1
Dissatisfaction with division on divorce can be approached in a variety of
ways: (1) an appeal from the order of the trial court alleging an error of
law or abuse of discretion, 1 32 (2) a bill of review alleging fraud, as for secreting assets at the time of divorce,' 3 3 or (3) a suit for partition of community
assets undivided by the court.13 4 If the property in question is held by a
third person, further problems of proof, joinder, and venue are presented.' 35
In Estabrook v. Wise' 3 6 foreign realty acquired during marriage was alleged
to have been secreted at the time of divorce. On discovery of these interests
subsequent to divorce, the ex-wife brought an in personam suit against the
ex-husband to convey a one-half interest in the properties. Though a Texas
divorce court may consider realty acquired in other jurisdictions in making
an equitable division of the property of the marriage,13 7 the Tyler court of
civil appeals disagreed with respect to whether the thrust of this suit was in
personam or in rem. The majority of the court was of the former and far
sounder view. In Mitchim v. Mitchim13 8 a foreign court, asserting jurisdiction of the parties by virtue of its long-arm statute, dissolved the marriage
130. See McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 26 Sw. L.J.

31, 33 n.20 (1972); McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 23
Sw. L.J. 44, 45-46 (1969).
131. Social Services Amendments of 1974, P.L. No. 93-647, § 459 (Jan. 4, 1975),

do not appear to offer any assistance in Texas to ex-spouses of federal pensioners.
132. See, e.g., Currie v. Currie, 518 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974,
writ dism'd). But an attorney's inattention to the client's affairs is not ordinarily a
ground for appeal. Law v. Law, 517 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974, writ
dism'd); Leonard v. Leonard, 512 S.W.2d 771 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974,
writ dism'd). See also Blancas v. Blancas, 495 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana

1973, no writ), a proceeding by way of writ of error.
But a writ of habeas corpus for release from confinement for contempt is not an ap-

propriate remedy to attack an order directing the ex-husband to deliver half of his subse-

quent naval pay to his ex-wife as a means of implementing division of community property. Ex parte Sutherland, 515 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1974, writ
dism'd).
133. See, e.g., Raney v. Mack, 504 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1973,
no writ). Inattention of one's attorney is not generally a ground for bill of review. See
McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 66, 70 (1974).
134. See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 500 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas

1973, no writ); Martinez v. Tavera, 503 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1973,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).

135. See, e.g., Isenberg v. Isenberg, 510 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1974, no writ); Boley v. Boley, 506 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1974,
no writ). See also McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27

Sw. L.J. 27, 40 (1973).

136. 506 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, writ granted, but dism'd ab initio

as moot).
137. See Walker v. Walker, 231 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1950, no
writ).
138. 509 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin), rev'd on other grounds, 518 S.W.2d

362 (Te=. 1974).
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of the spouses but did not purport to divide military retirement benefits of

the husband.

In the husband's Texas action for a declaration of invalidity

of the foreign decree, the wife asserted entitlement to one-half the retirement

benefits.

Disregarding the principle of vesting laid down in Busby v.

Busby, 139 and relying instead on Dessommes v. Dessommes,' 40 the court

made a division by defining community interest on the basis of benefits accrued while the spouses resided in community property states. No further
appeal was taken on this point.' 4' In Wilson v. Wilson 1 42 retirement benefits
undivided by a divorce court were again considered. The ex-wife sought a
partition. The trial court made a fractional award of less than half for the
wife, reflecting apparently the ratio of months of marriage to months of service. The husband appealed on the ground of an oral understanding at the
time of divorce that he would receive the whole of the retirement pay. The
appellate court held that the husband had failed to show the agreement on
which he relied and that he could not complain of the award he had received,
presumably, in light of the fact that the award did not measure up to the
1 48
standard of Busby and was thus in his favor.
D.

Management of MaritalProperty

The most significant area of judicial activity was that of management of
matrimonial property. In one year's time the courts have considered a variety of disputes involving the interpretation of the principal management pro139. 457 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. 1970).
140. 505 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.), discussed in
McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 66, 72-73 (1974).
141. The right to retirement benefits vested while the couple were living in California. Without any discussion of California law, the court assumed that Texas law, i.e.,
Busby, was applicable, but as modified by Dessommes. The dissenting judge interpreted
Busby as holding that when the husband's retirement benefits vest in a community property state, the wife becomes "entitled to her portion of that part of the interest in the
retirement plan which was earned while the parties were man and wife." 509 S.W.2d
at 726. See also the dissent in Lumpkins v. Lumpkins, 519 S.W.2d 491, 494-95 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1975, no writ).
In relation to the characterization question several factors have a bearing on the division of property: (1) finding and characterizing matrimonial property to divide, (2)
considering other "interests" and surrounding facts in the division of that property, and
(3) considering the nature of the property interest in allocating it wholly to one spouse
in spite of its community character or its character as separate property of the other
spouse. An excess of zeal in finding property to divide unduly strains the rules of characterization as is illustrated by Miser v. Miser, 475 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1971, writ dism'd), discussed in McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of

Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 27, 30-31 (1973), and the approach of the dissenting judge in
Lumpkins. See Comment, The Identification and Division of Intangible Community
Property: Slicing the Invisible Pie, 6 U. CAL. DAVIs L. REv. 26 (1973). If there is

property to divide, the court may perhaps consider other interests, perhaps even unvested
interests, in making the division. But even if an interest may be properly characterized
as community property, the court need not divide it between the spouses. Doubts surrounding its ultimate realization may very well prompt the court to deny a division when
a community interest might not ever be realized. This approach would avoid contrary
strains on characterization principles as are apparent in Currie v. Currie, 518 S.W.2d
386 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ dism'd).
142. 507 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, no writ).
143. The husband also asserted that some years of marriage were spent in non-community property states, but evidence of the law of those states was not offered at the
trial, and hence it was presumed to be the same as that of Texas.
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vision of the Code, 1 44 and its interrelationship with the principal liability provision 146 and the provision for protection of third persons. 146 In the two most
significant cases the question of the necessity of having both spouses before
the court arose in the context of whether or not the court could render a judgment binding the non-party spouse with respect to transactions involving community property. The consideration determinative of these cases is the capacity of a spouse to manage matrimonial property in particular instances.
In Cooper v. Texas Gull Industries147 the spouses acting together bought
realty (partly with cash and partly on credit, but there was no evidence of
the source of the cash) and the conveyance was made to both of them. Seeking rescission of the transaction, the husband alone brought suit against the
grantor in 1970. That suit was dismissed with prejudice against the husband.
In 1971 suit for similar relief was brought by the husband and wife jointly.
The grantor sought summary judgment on the basis of res judicata. The
spouses argued that the wife was an indispensable party to the prior suit and
the judgment was, therefore, void. The court reached the important conclusion that rule 39,148 as amended effective January 1, 1971, had radically
changed the earlier doctrine of joinder of parties. Under the new rule it will
"be rare indeed if there were a person whose presence was so indispensable
in the sense that his absence deprives the court of jurisdiction to adjudicate
between the parties already joined."'1 49 When two or more persons, therefore, have a mutual interest in the outcome of a judicial dispute, suit against
one of them does not necessitate the joinder of others whose interests may
be subject to later disposition. In reaching this conclusion with respect to
the matrimonial property involved, the court considered the consequences to
the wife's interest in the property in issue and her management powers with
respect to it. On the basis of the record (but without any analysis of it)
the court concluded that the property in issue was subject to the joint management of the spouses. 150 The court also concluded that the whole property
was subject to joint management by characterization of the purchase transaction as one achieved by the spouses acting together, a conclusion that would
put the purchase transaction within sections 5.22(b) or (c).' 61 But though
the court does not anywhere say so clearly, it seems that section 5.22(c) is
assumed to be applicable. 5 2 Since there was no evidence of an agreement
144. TEX. FAM. Coln ANN.§ 5.22 (1975).

145. Id. § 5.61.
146.

Id. § 5.24.

147. 513 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. 1974), noted in 52 TExAs L. REv. 1410 (1974); 6 ST.

MARY'S L.J. 93 (1975).
148. TEX.R. Civ. P. 39.
149. 513 S.W.2d at 204.

150. Without evidence as to its source, the cash portion of the purchase price was

apparently presumed to be community property under TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.02

(1975). There is no specific presumption spelled out in the Code with respect to the
management of community property the source of which is unknown but the court may
have found an intimation of a rule for joint management in id. § 5.22(c).
151. Id. §§ 5.22(b), (c).
152. The background of § 5.22 is best seen by examining art. 4621, from which it
was drawn. Ch. 309, § 1, art. 4621, [1967] Texas Laws 735, 738. Subsection (c) recodified the fourth independent clause of that article which was added as a sort of residuary clause to catch any situation (though the draftsmen could not think of one to
which it was necessarily specifically applicable) not covered by the three clauses which
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between the spouses that one or the other could represent both in this matter
of joint management, the court concluded that the wife's failure to participate
in the first suit did not foreclose her interest in the second suit and that the
dismissal of that suit against the husband would not affect her. In Dulak
v. Dulak,15s decided the same day as Cooper, the court reiterated the management point in a different context. In Dulak the husband and wife had
jointly purchased realty, which was conveyed to the spouses jointly, in return
for which they gave a joint note. The husband later procured the release
of the note from the seller, and suit was brought against him alone to cancel
this release as procured by his undue influence. The husband urged that
his wife was an indispensable party to the suit. Relying on Cooper, the court
concluded that a judgment binding the husband could be made without the
wife's joinder.
What has sometimes been called the "doctrine of virtual representation"
of the wife and her interest in community property subject to the husband's
management was swept away in Cooper and Dulak with respect to those in5 4
stances when joint management is appropriate.
In Cooper the court gave only a hint of what might be expected in a subsequent suit involving the wife's rights. The judgment of dismissal against
the husband in the first suit is not res judicata with respect to the rights of
the wife but is conclusive as to the husband "except to the extent that it might
have to be disregarded in giving [the wife] all the relief to which she may
show herself entitled."' 155 In both Cooper and Dulak it would have been
most appropriate to join both spouses in the suit, thus avoiding problems of
a later suit by or against the non-joined spouse.
In both Cooper and Dulak the supreme court alluded to the provision in
had gone before it. One of the draftsmen, however, expressed the view that credit purchases might properly be dealt with under this provision. See McKnight, Commentary
on the Texas Family Code, Title 1, 5 TEX. TECH L. REv. 281, 360-61 (1974). As is
there pointed out, this residual clause may also be applied when (1) the name or names
in which title is taken, or (2) the application of rules of express, resulting or constructive trust causes doubt as to whether subsection (a) [to which subsection (c) specifically
relates] is clearly applicable.
153. 513 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. 1974).
154. In Breeland v. Rice, 496 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1974), the validity of old art. 4619
as it stood prior to Jan. 1, 1968, was attacked on grounds of the equal protection and
due process clauses of the 14th amendment to the United States Constitution because
the husband was the only necessary party to suits with respect to community property
of which he was the manager. This was a sequel to Breeland v. Rice, 477 S.W.2d 906
(Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.). There deeds were taken in the
names of both spouses, but suit was brought only against the husband, though the wife
was ultimately joined. Under the law as it then stood, taking title in the name of husband and wife could not cause a departure from the presumption that the property was
community and subject to the management of the husband. The federal suit was dismissed by application of the principle of res judicata.
A somewhat similar argument was advanced in an attack on the Massachusetts rule
that a wife is unable to achieve an involuntary partition of a tenancy by the entireties
and thereby get management of half the estate. A three-judge court rejected the wife's
argument. Kline v. Mayo, 367 F. Supp. 583 (D. Mass. 1973), discussed in McKnight,
Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 66, 73-74 (1974), af 'd, 416
U.S. 953 (1974).
155. 513 S.W.2d at 205. See also Williams v. Saxon, 521 S.W.2d 88 (Tex. Civ. App.
-- San Antonio 1975, no writ), an alleged homestead case where neither the character
of the property as separate or community nor its management status (if community)
is defined.
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sections 5.22(b) and (c) (as they stood at times relevant to the disputes before the court), stating that property is subject to joint management of the
spouses "unless the spouses provide otherwise by power of attorney or agreement in writing."' 56 Relying on this language and without hearing oral arguments, the Supreme Court of Texas reversed the holding of the Austin court
of civil appeals in Evans v. Muller 1 7 to allow a creditor to reach jointly managed community property which the spouses has purported to put in the wife's
control without a written agreement. At the time that all the foregoing disputes arose the agreement between the spouses was required to be "in writing." In 1973 the legislature rearranged the quoted language of sections
5.22(b) and (c) to read "unless the spouses provide otherwise by power of
attorney in writing or other agreement." An oral or tacit understanding of
the spouses should, therefore, now comply with this provision.
Williams v. Portland State Bank'5 8 involved the interaction of sections

5.22 and 5.24. There the power to manage two tracts of community land
was in issue. The court held that a tract held in both names was community
property subject to joint management of the spouses. The court seems to
have held, without so stating, that another tract held in the name of the husband alone was also community property subject to joint management. A
bank had agreed to lend money on a note to be executed by the spouses
and secured by a deed of trust on both tracts. The wife, however, refused
to execute the note or the deed of trust. Knowing of the wife's refusal, the
bank accepted new instruments executed by the husband alone. After the
couple's divorce, in which title to both properties was awarded to the wife,
the ex-husband defaulted on the note and the wife brought suit to remove
the cloud of the bank's claim from her title. The bank counterclaimed
against both former spouses to foreclose its lien. The court concluded that
the bank's knowledge of the wife's refusal to join in the transaction put the
bank on "notice" to make further inquiry as to the extent of the husband's
authority to exercise the wife's power of disposition of the land. Judgment
was nonetheless entered for the bank for what would have been the ex-husband's half interest in the land. If "notice" related to the power of management, the court wrongly concluded that the community property in issue had
been subject to several rather than joint management of the spouses. 159
156. Ch. 888, § 1, [1969] Tex. Laws 2707, 2727 (emphasis added).

Note that sub-

section (a) does not contain a similar provision, though the lack of such a provision
should not preclude a spouse's allowing the other to deal with community property subject to his or her sole management, a situation that occurs frequently when one spouse
authorizes the other to order withdrawals from a bank account made up wholly of the
earnings of the authorizing spouse. But such authorization would not seem to constitute
the property as jointly managed community under §§ 5.22(b) or (c) for purposes of
§ 5.61. See McKnight, Texas Community Property Law-Its Course of Development
and Reform, 8 CAL. W.L. REV. 117, 139 (1971).

157. 510 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin), rev'd per curiam, 516 S.W.2d 923
(Tex.1974).
158. 514 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1974, writ granted but dism'd by
agreement).
159. Or did the court relate "notice" to the applicability of § 5.24? One tract was
in the joint names of the spouses; hence the deed on its face suggested an interest in
the wife which might have been a separate property interest or merely a joint managerial
power over community property as proved to be the case. The other tract stood in the
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Suing both spouses with respect to the sole acts of one spouse will not segregate that spouse's interest for purposes of judgment if a joint act of the
spouses had been required for disposition of an interest in the property at
issue. 16 0
Other decisions also dealt with spouses as parties to suits and the consequences of their unilateral acts.

In Myers v. Thomas 161 suit was brought

by the spouses for injuries sustained by the wife after the wife had reached
an agreement for settlement of the claim. The appellate court held that the
wife had full powers of management concerning a recovery for personal injury under section 5.22(a), 1 62 and, therefore, no cause of action for injury
to the wife could be brought by the husband. In McDonald v. Roemer' 5
an agricultural lessee brought suit against the husband and wife for breach
of an agricultural lease entered into solely by the wife. There were apparently no allegations as to the nature of the property. Since the cause of action was for breach of contract, the court's conclusion that the husband was
not a proper party thereto seems correct; no claim seems to have been asserted
that the wife was -acting as the husband's agent with respect to jointly managed community property.164 But if the suit had been for specific performance and the property had been community property subject to joint management, it would have been appropriate to bring suit against both spouses. In
Grace v. Rahlfs 6 5 a contract of insurance was entered into by the husband
and an insurance broker for the protection of mineral interests which constituted "their business :[which -the spouses operated] as a team.'1 66 In a suit
brought by the insurance broker against the husband for breach of the contract to pay premiums, it was contended by the defendant-husband that the
wife was the proper defendant rather than the husband because she was in
charge of the wells being drilled, the subject matter of the contract. The
contract was one for protection from loss for drilling for oil, a business in
which the husband and wife were apparently jointly engaged. The court rejected this contention, though it concluded that the insurance policies involved
were "at least a community property interest.' 167 Again the suit was one
for breach of contract to which only one spouse was a party. The court held
name of the husband alone and therefore should have been subject to § 5.24 unless the

bank had actual notice of his lack of authority to dispose of the property. As to the
first tract, is the court holding that § 5.24 applies as to an undivided half interest? If
this line of analysis was employed by the court, in the case of the second tract the husband's power to deal with the whole tract under § 5.24 is reduced to one-half by virtue

of the bank's "notice."
In any case, the court's holding would allow one spouse to achieve an involuntary partition of a community asset contrary to long-established rule. See McKnight, Commentary to the Texas Family Code, Title 1, 5 TEx. TECH L. REV. 281, 379 (1974).

160. "Joint and several" are so often coupled with respect to liability that some may
inadvertently think of the terms as perpetually conjoined and, therefore, synonymous.
161.

502 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1973, no writ).

162. TEx.

FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 5.22(a) (1975).

163. 505 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, no writ).
164. Cf. Harrington v. Pelkey, 424 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1968,
writ ref'd n.r.e.), noted in McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 23 Sw. L.J. 44, 53 (1969).

165. 508 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
166. Id. at 161.
167. Id.
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that the husband was the only proper party to the action. l 6 8
Though the principal impact of Evans v. Muller'0 9 is with respect to the
interaction of sections 5.22 and 5.61 as to availability of particular community property to satisfy liability of a spouse to his creditor, the Austin court
of civil appeals analyzed the underlying transaction in terms of section 5.22.
As part of an apparent attempt to partition their community estate, without
proper compliance with the formalities required by section 5.42, the husband
and wife conveyed their community homestead to purchasers and took as partial payment a note naming the wife only as payee. The management status
of the community realty sold was not alluded to by the court. The trial court
found that the transaction did not constitute a gift by the husband to the wife
and also rejected the allegation that the transaction was made with intent to
defraud the husband's creditors. 170 One of the husband's creditors sought
to garnish sums payable to the wife under the note. Without considering the
possibility of characterizing the proceeds of sale of the community property
for management purposes on the basis of the management of the property
sold, the court seems to assume the applicability to them of section 5.22(c)
rather than section 5.22(b), although the consequences with respect to the
outcome of the case would be the same. The court rejected the argument
of the applicability of section 5.22(a).
E.

Liability of MaritalProperty

The close relationship between management and liability of marital property is well illustrated by Evans v. Muller.'71 The fact that a debt owed
to the community and subject to joint management of the spouses was evidenced by a note payable only to the wife was of no avail to the wife in
protecting a payment due on the note from the husband's creditor, who
sought to garnish it as property subject to his joint management. In reversing
the decision of the court of appeals the supreme court held in Muller v.
Evans172 that at all times relevant to the case' 7 3 section 5.22(c) required the
168. In response to an enquiry whether under the Ethics Act of 1973, Tax. REY. Cv.
art. 6252-9b, § 4(a) (Supp. 1974), a spouse who is a state official must
report the financial activities of the other spouse's separate property over which the reporting spouse has no control, the attorney general concluded that the registrant must
report on the financial activities "of his spouse . . . on which activities the registrant
exercises any degree of control, legal or factual." TEx. ATT'Y GEN. Op. No. H-269
STAT. ANN.

(1974).

169. 510 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin), rev'd, 516 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. 1974).

170. For a general treatment of this and some other problems under § 5.22, see
Comment, Section 5.22 of the Texas Family Code: Control and Management of the

Marital Estate, 27 Sw. L.J. 837 (1973).

For gifts made by a spouse in fraud of the

other, see Note, Gifts in Fraudof the Rights of the Wife, 26 BAYLOR L. Rnv. 85 (1974).
In Becknal v. Atwood, 518 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ), the

court said that a spouse could not complain that a transfer by the other spouse constituted a constructive fraud ?f the complaining spouse was a participant in the transaction.
171.

510 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974), rev'd, 516 S.W.2d 923 (Tex.

1974).
172. 516 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. 1974).
173. "At the time this case was tried on January 17, 1973, and at all relevant times
before, Section 5.22(c) of the Family Code required that such an agreement be 'by
power of attorney or other agreement in writing.'" Id. at 923-24. But from September
1968 when the sale of the property occurred until January 1, 1970, when § 5.22 super-
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spouses' written agreement to alter joint management of this property. Section 5.24 of the Family Code was irrelevant to the wife's argument as it operates "not for the benefit of the spouse, but instead for the protection of those
third persons who may deal with the spouse in possession or in whose name
'174
the property is held."
The common law tenancy by the entireties may be analogized to community property in some respects. Though as the tenancy by the entireties
operates in some jurisdictions for purposes of liability, it is unlike Texas community property subject to joint management of the spouses, as several recent
cases illustrate. Debts owed by one spouse only are not recoverable from
such a tenancy but only those owed by both spouses jointly. 175 Such a tenone
ancy by -the entireties would not pass to the trustee in bankruptcy of
176
It
it.
transfer
to
power
had
alone
acting
spouse
that
unless
only,
spouse
may be argued that a Texas joint tenancy with right of survivorship between
husband and wife, properly created,1 77 should by analogy be subject to these
same rules.
In Cockerham v. Cockerham17 s the wife's trustee in bankruptcy intervened
in her suit for divorce, seeking payment of the wife's debts from jointly managed community property. The husband and wife had purchased realty with
borrowed money. It is not clear from the opinion whether both spouses were
participants in the borrowing but it may reasonably be conjectured that they
were. The purchase was nonetheless a cash purchase, albeit with borrowed
money. Although the lender was given a vendor's lien on the property purchased, the opinion does not reveal how the loan was discharged, though it
apparently had been. The dissenting judge characterized the property as
community subject to joint management of the spouses under section 5.22(c)
and, therefore, subject to seizure by the wife's creditors to discharge her
debts. The majority of the court, however, apparently regarded the property
as subject to the sole management of the husband pursuant to a tacit understanding of the spouses, since he alone was in actual control of the business
conducted there. It would seem, therefore, that the reasoning of the court
seded ch. 309, § 1, art. 4621, [1967] Tex. Laws 735, 738, the latter article merely provided that "mixed or combined community property is subject to joint management...
unless the spouses otherwise provide." 516 S.W.2d at 738.
174. 510 S.W.2d 651, 655. In another garnishment proceeding, Redisco v. Laredo
Mopac Employees Credit Union, 516 S.W.2d 197 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974,
no writ), a garnishee held funds for the wife as well as the husband without knowledge
of any possible interest the husband might have had in the wife's account. Nor was
it shown that the garnishee knew that its two depositors were husband and wife. Hence,
the garnishee had no duty to respond with respect to funds held for the wife when garnished with respect to funds held for the husband.
That separate funds of one spouse are not subject to garnishment for debts owed by
the other unless both are liable by other rules of law is spelled out clearly in § 5.61(a)
of the Family Code. See also Texas Commerce Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Tripp, 516 S.W.2d
256 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1974, writ granted).
175. In re Kline, 370 F. Supp. 152 (W.D. Va. 1973); Farmington Prod. Credit Ass'n
v. Estes, 504 S.W.2d 149 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974).
176. In re Kitrell, 380 F. Supp. 587 (E.D. Mo. 1974).
177. See McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 21 Sw. LJ.
39, 43-44 (1967). See also McKnight, Management, Control and Liability of Marital
Property in TExAS FAMILY LAw & COMMUNITY PROPERTY 159, 17982 (J. McKnight ed.
11 S.W.2d 150 (Tex. Cir. App.-Waco 1974, writ granted).
1975
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in Muller should have been equally applicable to this case, as there was no
evidence of a written understanding between the parties with respect to management. On the other hand, if the facts of Muller and Cockerham had
arisen after January 1, 1974, the results as to creditors in each case would

be different, unless a fraudulent intent to hinder them could be shown. 179
As of January 1, 1974, the position of the words "in writing" in sections 5.22
(b) and (c) were shifted so that the clause containing them reads: "unless
the spouses provide otherwise by power of attorney in writing or other agreement."
Just as a spouse's trustee in bankruptcy may intervene in a suit between
the spouses, an ex-spouse may intervene in the bankruptcy proceeding of a
former spouse for an adjudication that certain liabilities, already fixed between them, are not affected by the discharge in bankruptcy. In In re Nunnally'8 0 an ex-wife, who had been awarded a money judgment on divorce
either by way of reimbursement or for repayment of a loan, intervened in
her ex-husband's voluntary bankruptcy proceeding. The ex-husband asserted that this claim, secured by a lien on that part of his naval retirement

benefits awarded to him, as well as the award to his ex-wife for her attorney's
fees, should be discharged. On behalf of the former wife the court held that
the bankruptcy label of non-dischargeable "alimony" applied to this award
rather than the Texas label of "property division."''

On behalf of the bank-

rupt the court treated his retirement pay as not passing to the trustee for the
82
benefit of his creditors.'

179. This assertion as to fraud assumes the applicability of TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE
ANN. §§ 24.02 or 24.03 (1968) to this situation, i.e., that the agreement or understanding between the spouses, evidenced in writing or otherwise, by which control is exercised
by one spouse only, constitutes a "transfer" as that term is used in the statute. In making this assertion it is also assumed that such an understanding between the spouses has
an impact inter alios as Muller suggests and is not limited in effect inter se as the draftsmen of §§ 5.22 and 5.61 almost certainly intended. This conclusion also presupposes
that the provision in § § 5.22(b), (c) allowing the spouses to provide otherwise is constitutional. It may be argued, however, that if a partition of community property between
spouses cannot defeat prior creditors' claims as a broad reading of the 1948 amendment
to the constitution suggests, an agreement with respect to management of jointly controlled community which would have the same effect may be equally repugnant to the
Constitution. See TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 15 (1948).
180. 506 F.2d 1024 (5th Cir. 1975).
181. The award of attorney's fees was also treated as "alimony" for bankruptcy purposes. See also In re Smith, No. BK-3-2065 (N.D. Tex. July 2, 1973), noted in McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 66, 77 (1974); In re

Waller, 494 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1974), where the provision of a divorce decree to the
effect that the husband should hold the ex-wife harmless for all existing debts also constituted alimony; In re Freeman, 489 F.2d 431 (9th Cir. 1973), with respect to a contest
between a California ex-husband and the bankruptcy trustee of his former wife concerning an income tax refund.
182. See Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642 (1974). An interest "designed to function as a wage-substitute" at some future period and, during that future period, to "support the basic requirements of life" for the debtor does not pass to his trustee in bankruptcy. Id. at 648. See also Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18 (1970). But the bankrupt's interest in the cash surrender value of a life insurance policy in favor of his
mother (with his children as only contingent beneficiaries) passed to the trustee. See
also In re Gould, 457 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1972). An earlier stage of this proceeding
is noted in McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 26 Sw. L.J.

31, 41 n.85 (1972).
In In re McCoy, 373 F. Supp. 870 (W.D. Tex. 1974), the trustee in bankruptcy was
successful inasserting a claim to the debtor's recovery for wrongful death.
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In recent years there have been a number of constitutional amendments
affecting the homestead exemption.' 8 3 Additional proposals for constitutional change may be anticipated. Though the Constitutional Convention,
which met during 1974, was unable to agree to a document to submit to the
electorate, the Convention had drafted new provisions on homestead. The
most significant change would have allowed a mortgage to be placed on threefourths of a rural homestead and on an urban business homestead as ordinary

security for a loan. The draft further provided that a change from rural to
urban homestead should not occur without the consent of the claimant, 1 84 but
it retained the $3,000 homestead exemption from state taxes.18 5
A recital in a mortgage of dwelling A that the mortgagor's dwelling B (a
property equally capable of being a homestead) is the mortgagor's homestead' 8 6 is an act of different juridical consequences from that of filing a
homestead designation for tax purposes with respect to dwelling B when
dwelling A is mortgaged. In Evans v. Steiner'87 the appellate court concluded that as to the second act there was a clear dispute of fact as to the
homestead character of the properties which precluded summary judgment.
There were also issues of fraud or mistake. As to the logically related question of whether two persons may simultaneously claim a homestead in the
same property (not yet before a Texas appellate court with regard to the
construction of the 1973 constitutional amendment allowing single persons to

claim homesteads),

88

an Arizona court1 8 9 concluded on the basis of an

earlier Texas authority' 90 that two or more persons with a property interest

in a home may claim a homestead exemption in the same property.
Abandonment of a homestead is, of course, a question of fact. In Atwood
v. Guaranty Construction Co.' 9 ' the court decided that if a part of an urban
183. The effective date of those amendments is of some consequence. The point is
discussed in McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 25 Sw. L.J. 34, 48
(1971).
See also McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J.
66, 84, n.133 (1974). Further elucidation of the point is found in Christian v. Howeth,
No. 17595 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth, Oct. 18, 1974, no writ).
184. DRAFT TEX. CONST. art. X, § 12 (1974); cf. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50.
185. DRAFT TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(b) (1974). Art. VIII, §§ 2(d), (e) also
allowed political subdivisions and the legislature, respectively, to give further homestead
tax relief to the aged, disabled and poor. The attorney general concluded that the 1971
statute, TEX. REV. Cv. STAT. ANN. art. 7329a (Supp. 1974), providing that delinquent
taxes may not be collected or foreclosed on homesteads of those over 65, is constitutional, TEX. ATr'y GEN. Op. No. H-364 (1974), and that a person over 65 may claim
tax exemption even though he has failed to do so during the statutory period. TEx.
ATT'Y GEN. Op. No. H-309 (1974).
With respect to taxation of mobile homes and their homestead character, see Hart v.
Northside Ind. School Dist., 498 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); TEX. Arr'y GEN. Op. No. H-514 (1974).
186. Purdy v. Grove, 35 S.W.2d 1078 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1931, writ ref'd);
cf. Texas Land & Loan Co. v. Blalock, 76 Tex. 85, 13 S.W. 12 (1890).
187. 511 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974, no writ).
188. See McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 66, 84
(1974).
See also Note, Effects of Extending the Homestead Exemption to Single
Adults, 26 BAYLOR L. REV. 658 (1974).
189. First Nat'l Bank v. Boyd, 378 F. Supp. 961 (D. Ariz. 1974).
190. Johnson v. Prosper State Bank, 125 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1939),
aff'd, 134 Tex. 677, 138 S.W.2d 1117 (1940).
191. 63 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933, jdgmt of the court of civil appeals
rev'd and jdgmt of the district court afl'd).
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homestead is fenced off and redeveloped as rental property, the segregated
portion loses its homestead character and a mortgage on it is valid for any
purpose. In Hollijield v. Hilton'92 spouses gave a mechanic's lien for improvements on eighteen acres (a part of a sixty-acre rural homestead) developed as a mobile home park. The landowners' home was within the eighteen
acres. The homestead claimants asserted that the lien could not attach to
the whole eighteen acres since only a part of it was affected and the home
itself had not been improved. The court held that the lien was valid for improvements even if the entire property constituted the homestead, and the
claimants did not abandon any part of the property as their homestead. The
use of part of the property as a mobile home park, it was concluded, was
not incompatible with the claimants' assertion that the entire tract was rural
homestead. In effect, the court held that the granting of a mechanic's lien
for improvement of a part of a rural homestead (though not for the improvement of the dwelling itself) constitutes a valid lien on the whole homestead
area, including the dwelling. The analogous urban situation is that of a mechanic's lien for adding a garage apartment to an urban home to be rented
to a tenant.
The characterization, management, and liability of exempt realty and personalty were also the subject matter of continuing disputes. Management of
the homestead property, whether separate or community, was before the
courts in two disputes concerning conveyances. In one' 9 3 a conveyance of
homestead property naming the husband and wife as grantors was executed
and acknowledged by the husband alone. Vendor's lien notes were given
by the grantee husband and wife who were, respectively, the grantors' sonin-law and daughter. Later, the husband and wife grantors joined in executing and acknowledging a receipt and release, apparently without consideration, for the notes. A dispute arose between the grantees with respect to
the validity of the conveyance subsequent to the grantees' divorce in which
the property was not divided. The court concluded that the joint execution
of the receipt and release ratified the conveyance and made it fully effective.
Whether the transaction was for consideration, or not, was immaterial.' 94 In
the other case' 95 the husband, as grantor of a homestead, sought damages
but not specific performance under a contract of sale against the purchaser.
The grantor's wife did not execute the contract nor did the husband-grantor
tender a deed jointly conveying the property, or for that matter any deed
192. 515 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
193. Kunkel v. Kunkel, 515 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
194. Though the parties stipulated that the 258 rural acres involved in the transaction
were the community homestead of the grantors, that stipulation could not affect the constitutional limitation on the extent of a rural homestead and, therefore, the husband's
conveyance of the acreage exceeding the 200-acre limitation was initially valid as subject
to his sole community management without the wife's joinder or acknowledgement. It
was essentially the position of the ex-wife grantee that the original grant was void and
incapable of ratification. This contention was rejected by the court.
For post mortem situations see Note, Survivor's Options When Homestead Tract Exceeds ConstitutionalLimits, 26 BAYLOR L. REv. 671 (1974).

195. Dickey v. Johnson, 513 S.W.2d 876 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1974, writ ref'd

n.r.e.).
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at all, but the grantor and his wife merely demonstrated a joint readiness
and willingness to execute a deed to the purchaser.

The court concluded

that the purchaser's default relieved the seller of tendering a deed joined in
by his wife, and the seller was therefore entitled to his damages.

"Ifthe

seller had breached the contract to convey the homestead he would have been
1 96
liable for damages, even though his wife had not signed the contract.'
The United States as a creditor need not be much concerned with exemptions and related doctrines asserted under state law. 197 In Diehl v. United
States'9" the court concluded that the federal government's tax claim was not
void by reason of prior dismissal, on jurisdictional grounds, of the government's claim, and that the allegation of the deceased husband's widow that
she was "an innocent spouse" was not enough to ground her claim for an
injunction against the United States for collection of back income taxes
against him. 199
With respect to personal property, 200 in 1973 the legislature repealed the
landlord's lien statute which had been declared unconstitutional in Hall v.

Garson20 and replaced it with provisions giving a landlord's lien for unpaid
rent on the non-exempt personalty of the tenant (there defined), but without
any right of seizure by the landlord except as pursuant to the terms of the

written lease unless the tenant abandons the premises. 20 2 In response to an
inquiry the attorney general clarified existing law by concluding that a levy196. Id. at 877. The court relied on Buehring v. Hudson, 219 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Galveston 1949, writ ref'd), and Allen v. Monk, 505 S.W.2d 523 (Tex. 1974).
In Williams v. Saxon, .521 S.W.2d 88 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, no writ),
a vendee succeeded in his suit against the husband alone for specific performance of his
contract to convey realty a part of which was an alleged homestead. The court held
that the wife's homestead interest in the property, if any, was not affected by the judgment. But if the property was a homestead and the wife refused to join in the conveyance, the court did not explain how the decree of specific performance could be given
effect.
197. See, e.g., Herndon v. United States, 501 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Eaves, 499 F.2d 869 (10th Cir. 1974), noted in 12 Hous. L. REv. 281 (1974);
cf. United States v. Hershberger, 475 F.2d 677 (10th Cir. 1973), aff'g 338 F. Supp. 804
(D. Kan. 1972), discussed in McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 27, 42 n.124 (1973).
With regard to the homestead in bankruptcy, see Miguel v. Walsh, 447 F.2d 724 (9th
Cir. 1971), discussed in Comment, Bankruptcy Section 70(c): The Effect of Bankruptcy on a Homestead Which Is Subject to the Claim of a Defrauded Creditor-The
Ninth Circuit View, 45 So. CAL. L. REv. 914 (1972).
198. 373 F. Supp. 1069 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
199. See also Babb v. Schmidt, 496 F.2d 957 (9th Cir. 1974).
200. By way of correction of statements made with respect to Coghlan v. Sullivan,
480 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1972, no writ), in McKnight, Matrimonial
Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 27, 41-42 (1973), the couple were
not divorced in that instance. Thus, the provisions of TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
3836(a)(3) (Supp. 1974) was applicable to one of the automobiles. The question remains whether TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.61(b) (1975) would protect the wife in her
claim to the automobile, the certificate of title to which was held solely in her name.
As §§ 5.22(b), (c) now stand, it may be argued that placing the title in her name
(if the property was indeed jointly managed community) is strong evidence that the parties agreed that the wife should have sole management of the car. The question of violation of TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 24.02 or 24.03 (1968) would still be open,
however. For a fuller analysis see McKnight, Management, Control and Liability of
Marital Property in TEXAS FAMILY LAW & COMMUNrrY PRoPERTY 159, 175-76 (J. McKnight ed. 1975).
201. 468 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1972); see ch. 686, §§ 1-5 19,69] Tex. Laws 2008-09.
202. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5236d (Supp. 1974).
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ing officer may not make forcible entry to seize property subject to a writ
of attachment or other process, but if entry is refused improperly, the debtor
20
may be cited for contempt. 3
II.

PARENTS AND CHILDREN

A.

Status

The threshold question with respect to a child's status is that of parentage.
In 1777, in Goodright ex dim. Stevens v. Moss,2 0

4

Lord Mansfield stated the

rule that neither a husband nor a wife might give testimony that would tend
to prove that the child was not that of the husband if the child was born
during the marriage of the spouses. The rule with its various corollaries 20 5
has tended to defy the passage of time and changes in attitudes toward marriage. In Davis v. Davis20 6 the Houston (Fourteenth District) court of civil
appeals refused to follow the rule because it could not "subscribe to the position that a rule without any foundation in reason must be blindly applied
by the courts out of mere habit .... -207 After careful consideration, the
Supreme Court of Texas, though reversing the lower court on other grounds,
and thus rejected a rule which had
sustained the soundness of this opinion
208
been allowed to stand for so long.
The provisions of chapter 13 of the Family Code for voluntary affiliation
of illegitimates were designed as part of a comprehensive code covering the
status of children born out of wedlock. 20 9 But the provisions with respect
to involuntary affiliation were not enacted in 1973 along with those for volun203. TEx. Arr'y GEN. Op. No. H-449 (1974). A peripheral point with regard to
household furnishings was decided in Republic Ins. Co. v. Silverton Elevators, Inc., 493
S.W.2d 748 (Tex. 1973), concerning a corporate house furnished to its executive as part
of his compensation for the protection of which the corporation bought insurance on
the house and household goods. The insurance company was adequately apprised of the
fact that the household goods belonged to the executive. After the house and its contents were destroyed by fire, the insuror paid for the house but denied liability for its
contents. The court held that the insurance company was liable to the executive on the
policy. Issuing the policy and collecting premiums with knowledge of the facts constituted a waiver of any requirement that the insured owned a beneficial interest in the
contents.
204. 2 Cowp. 591, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257 (K.B. 1777).
205. See McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 66, 8788 (1974).
206. 507 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974).
207. Id. at 846-47.
208. Davis v. Davis, 521 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. 1975). The result was that the child
of a putative marriage along with other legitimate children of the deceased father shared
in his intestate estate whereas a child born during, but not of, his subsisting marriage
did not.
When the Supreme Court of the United States made it clear that an illegitimate child
has certain rights from its actual father, Texas was one of the few states that still maintained the contrary rule. Hence, proof of paternity in the case of illegitimates became
a potential subject for dispute in Texas, where the subject had rarely arisen before. The
imposition of duties upon fathers of illegitimates, therefore, contributed to the reconsideration of rules of evidence that might preclude disproof of paternity in the situation
of adulterine bastardy to which Lord Mansfield's rule applied. For an instance involving standing of the biological father to assert paternity of an adulterine bastard
(though the fact of paternity was not in dispute) after long lapse of time following the
divorce of the husband and wife during whose marriage the child was born, see L. v.
R., 518 S.W.2d 113 (Mo. App. 1974).
209. See Smith, Commentary to the Texas Family Code, Title 2, 5 TEx. TECH L.
REv. 389, 418 (1974).
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tary affiliation, 210 which partially duplicate provisions of the Probate Code
relating to voluntary affiliation by marriage of the parents of a bastard
child.2 1 1 The carefully drawn provisions of section 13.01(a) 212 presupposed
the continued effectiveness of Lord Mansfield's rule: "The father of a child
not the legitimate child of another man may institute a suit for a decree designating him as the father of the child unless the parent-child relationship has
been terminated under Chapter 15 of this Code. '213 A beneficial consequence of Texas's failure to provide duties in fathers of illegitimates is the
fact that the question was long left open with regard to the admissibility of
blood grouping tests to establish non-paternity. 21 4 Without earlier contrary
precedent, Texas courts should find such evidence easily acceptable.

The consequences to the parent-child relationship arising from tortious conduct by and toward third persons was before the Texas courts.

In Kennedy

v. Kennedy 215 the Austin court of civil appeals concluded that an unemancipated minor cannot recover for hospital and medical expenses incurred during
minority or for loss of earnings during minority, but rather that only the parent has that right. The court also concluded that negligence of an adult
member of a joint enterprise may not be imputed to a minor engaged in the
same enterprise. 21 6 Since the family purpose, or family car, doctrine is not
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 13.01-13.06 (1975).
211. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 42 (1956). This provision was originally enacted in
1840. Act of Jan. 28, 1840, § 15, [1840] Tex. Laws 132, 135, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS
OF TEXAs 306, 309 (1898). The 1840 statute provided that the child became the legitimate child of the father "if recognized by him." The 1955 version of this statute provided that the child born out of wedlock was legitimized merely by the marriage of his
parents. The question with respect to whether the child was actually the biological offspring of the father is still there nonetheless.
212. TEX. FAM.CODE ANN.§ 13.01(a) (1975).
213. Id. But the provision is nonetheless still viable in the absence of the rule.
Cf. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.02(a) (1975). But see Smith, Commentary to the
Texas Family Code, Title 2, 5 TEX.TECH L. REV. 389, 414-15 (1974).
The succeeding language of the section with respect to the required consent of the
mother or the managing conservator of the child seems of dubious validity. But see In
re K, 520 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, no writ); see Comment,
The Putative Father's Rights After Roe v. Wade, 6 ST. MARY's L.J. 407 (1974). In
Slawek v. Stroh, 62 Wis. 2d 295, 215 N.W.2d 9 (1974), the Wisconsin Supreme Court
held that there is a constitutional right on the part of an alleged father to prove paternity
with respect to a child born out of wedlock. See also Miller v. Miller, 504 F.2d 1067
(9th Cir. 1974), invalidating the Oregon statute which allows adoption of a child born
out of wedlock with the consent of the mother without notice to or consent of the father.
214. In Beck v. Beck, 304 N.E.2d 541 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974), the court held such tests
admissible.
215. 505 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974, no writ).
216. In Shockley v. Prier, 66 Wis. 2d 394, 225 N.W.2d 495 (1975), the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin concluded that a parent may maintain an action for the loss of "aid,
comfort, society and companionship" of a child. In combining the parent's action with
that of the child for the child's personal injuries, the court rejected the long accepted
rule for measuring damages recoverable by parents for the injury of a minor child as
the difference between the cost of rearing the child and the economic benefits of the
child's services. The Supreme Court of Iowa held in Handeland v. Brown, 216 N.W.2d
574 (Iowa 1974), that a child's contribution to his own negligent injury is not a defense
to a parental claim for loss of services and companionship of the child. In a New York
case, Lastowski v. Norge Coin-O-Matic, Inc., 44 App. Div. 2d 127, 355 N.Y.S.2d 432
(Sup. Ct. 1974), the court held that the parent's lack of supervision of an unemancipated
child's conduct is not a bar to the parent's recovery for injury to the child. Interference
with the parent-child relationship by another, as when a third person in defense of his
own child ordered another's offensive child from a playground, may result in the intermeddler's liability if he fails to escort the child home. Hernandez v. Toney, 289 So. 2d
210.
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applicable in Texas, the relationship of principal and agent must be established by some other means than a declaration of the agent alone in order
to establish liability for the child's negligent operation of a family automo217
bile.
Prior to January 1, 1974, since the parent-child relationship was subject
8
to conditional termination, the proceeding was subject to being reopened. 21
Chapter 15 of the Family Code replaces the old dependency proceeding with
a modern termination proceeding. 219 Sections 15.02(l)(B) and (E) provide grounds for termination of parental rights when the parent does not attend to the support of a child. 22 ) The one-year provision of section 15.02(1)
(E) replaces article 46(a), section 6(a), 221 which authorized adoption with318 (La. Ct. App. 1973). But in a case of related, but different, emphasis the Supreme
Court of Washington in State v. Koome, 84 Wash. 2d 901, 530 P.2d 260 (1974), reversed the conviction of a physician for performing an abortion on an unmarried minor
without obtaining the consent of her parent. The court held that the requirement of
parental consent is unconstitutional as an unwarranted intrusion on the minor's right to
privacy.
But the child has no cause of action against a parent for negligent supervision resulting in the child's injury. Ryan v. Fahey, 43 App. Div. 2d 429, 352 N.Y.S.2d 283 (Sup.
Ct. 1974). A New York court also held that no right of action exists on behalf of children for deprivation of services and society of their parent caused by the tortious conduct of another. Duhan v. Milanowski, 75 Misc. 2d 1078, 348 N.Y.S.2d 696 (Sup. Ct.
1973), noted in 20 N.Y.L.F. 406 (1974).
217. Jones v. Hopper, 506 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974,
no writ). See also Note, Has the Family Code Made Any Changes in the Liability of
a Parent for His Child's Conduct?, 26 BAYLOR L. REV. 687 (1974).
218. See Smith, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 45, 52
(1973).
An unusual succession of facts and legal proceedings gave rise to the dispute in In
re H- D-, 511 S.W.2d 615 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). A child was
born to the mother out of wedlock. The alleged father then adopted the child and the
father later married the mother informally. In the adoption, however, the mother's
parental rights were "terminated." The couple were then divorced and custody of the
child was granted to the husband by virtue of the fact that the mother's parental rights
had been terminated. The couple later remarried. After suit was again commenced for
divorce, the mother brought a bill of review to set aside the adoption, but grounds for
relief by bill of review were not shown. Though the mother's petition was dismissed,
her proceeding for conservatorship was severed from her divorce proceeding and remanded in spite of the disposition of the other proceeding. In re Marriage of D-, 511
S.W.2d 606 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ).
In Clark v. Tarrant County Child Welfare Unit, 509 S.W.2d 378 (Tex. Civ. App.Fort Worth 1974, no writ), the court held that 1965 legislation giving a domestic relations court concurrent jurisdiction with that of district courts (impliedly repealing a 1943
statute giving district courts original jurisdiction in all dependent and neglected child
cases) was not an unconstitutional infringement of the jurisdiction of district courts under TEx. CONST. art. V, § 8.
219. Ex parte Johnny G-, 512 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, no
writ), was a dependency proceeding initiated before 1974 but tried after chapter 15 became effective. Relying on the transition provisions of title 2, ch. 543, § 4(a), [1973]
Tex. Laws 1459, the court held that the law in effect prior to January 1, 1974, was properly applied. In another case arising under the old law, Gray v. Texas, 508 S.W.2d 454
(Tex. Civ. App.-Texarakana 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the court held that failure of the
trial judge to appoint a guardian ad litem for a minor in a dependency proceeding would
not invalidate the proceeding when the parents of the child participated in the proceeding. Cf. Cleaver v. Wilcox, 499 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1974), with respect to appointment
of counsel for indigent parents.
220. These provisions make it possible to terminate the parent-child relation when
that result could not have been achieved under the old dependent and neglected child
act. TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. arts. 2330-37 (1974). As to problems under the old
law of the non-dependent child, see Smith, Commentary on the Texas Family Code,
Title 2, 5 TEX. TEcH L. REV. 389 448-49 (1974), and authorities there cited. See also
Hogan v. Roop, 500 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1973, no writ).
221. Act of June 17, 1969, ch. 700, § 3, [1969] Tex. Laws 1819 (repealed 1973).
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out parental consent after failure of parental support for two years. 222
Though for purposes of federal social security benefits a situation supporting equitable adoption has been found under circumstances that might not
satisfy Texas law,223 a relaxation in grounds for equitable adoption under
state law seems to be in process. In Deveroex v. Nelson224 the court held
that a foreign contract to adopt, unenforceable at the place of contracting,
will nevertheless give standing to a person claiming adoption by estoppel as
"nearest relative" under section 21.23 of the Texas Insurance Code. 225 In
Ramsay v. Lane228 equitable adoption for purposes of inheritance was established by showing that the father, though not the mother, agreed that third
persons might adopt the child and the child lived with them as their child.
On that basis the court found a contract on the part of the foster parents
to adopt the child and performance by the child in reliance on the agreement.
B. Conservatorship
The act of 1973,227 effective January 1, 1974, provides that when a court
acquires jurisdiction of a suit affecting the parent-child relationship, that court
retains continuing, exclusive jurisdiction for the adjudication of the conservatorship of children, but it may transfer the proceeding to another county
where venue is proper as an accommodation to changed residence of the parties. A central record file of decrees entered in suits affecting the parentchild relationship is required to be kept by the Department of Public Welfare. 228 With respect to judgments entered prior to January 1, 1974, special
transition provisions 229 prescribe in effect that proceedings for readjustment
222. For application of tests prescribed in the old statute, see Cawley v. Allums, 518

S.W.2d 790 (Tex. 1975); Smallwood v. Swarner, 510 S.W.2d 156 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, writ refd n.r.e.). In Floyd v. Seward, 520 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1
Paso 1975, no writ), the court remanded the case for determination whether applying
the shorter period of non-support under § 15.02(1)(E) rather than the longer period
under the old law would be feasible and would not work an injustice under the transition

provision of the act.

The terms of this subsection also dispose of problems involved

in the meaning of "abandonment" under the old statute.

For the question whether im-

prisonment could constitute or contribute to abandonment, see Elliott v. Maddox, 510
S.W.2d 105 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth, no writ); Jordan v. Hancock, 508 S.W.2d
878 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ).

The attorney general has provided guidance with respect to several points of the adop-

tion process.

In TEx. Arr'y GEN. Op. No. H-362 (1974)

the attorney general con-

cluded that the trial judge can include the costs of the background study on prospective
parents as court costs to an adoption. In TEx. Arr'Y GEN. Op. No. H-466 (1974) the
view was expressed that the district clerk is required to furnish the file of an adoption
case to the department of public welfare within a reasonable time after the entry of a
decree. See also TEX. Air'y GEN. Op. Nos. H-353, H-431 (1974) with respect to the
general record keeping responsibility of the department of public welfare under Tax.
FAM. CoDE ANN. tit. 2 (1975). Though no Texas cases gave rise to the question of
the rights of adoptive parents when a licensed agent abrogates placement, a California
case defined the rights of procedural due process for the prospective adoptive parents.

See C. v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. App. 3d 909, 106 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1973).
223. See, e.g., Broussard v. Weinberger, 499 F.2d 969 (5th Cir. 1974).
224. 517 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, writ granted).
225. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. § 21.23 (1963). With respect to children brought into
the state for the purpose of adoption, see TEx. ATr'y GEN. Op. No. H-582 (1975).
226. 507 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
227. Ch. 543, § 1, [1973] Tex. Laws 1411.
228. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 11.05, 11.17 (1975). See also TEx. ATr'v GEN. Op.
Nos. H-353, H-431 (1974).

229. Ch. 543, § 4, [1973] Tex. Laws 1459.
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of conservatorship are treated as new suits for which no court has continuing,
exclusive jurisdiction. 23 0 The court in which such a suit to modify conservatorship is first filed has "dominant jurisdiction to the exclusion of other
courts." '231 The controlling venue provisions are those found in section
11.04, which places the venue at the place of residence of the child as there
defined. The court of dominant jurisdiction has exclusive power to determine the venue question. 23 2 Under pre-January 1, 1974, law the court first
ordering a support obligation had continuing exclusive jurisdiction to modify
support obligations, but this is no longer the case in a strict sense. 23 3 "Although not required by the Code, orderly administration of the law is more
likely if post-January 1 suits involving support are filed in the court that decreed the obligation [as previously required] with transfer if the forum is
an improper venue. ' 23 4 With respect to proceedings brought prior to January
1, 1974, and still sub judice after January 1, 1974, the provisions of the 1973
act apply unless their application "would not be feasible or would work injus23
tice." 5
In proceedings involving the parent-child relationship, the court may make
minor children, whose rights are involved in the proceedings, parties to the
238
proceedings and appoint a guardian ad litem for them as under earlier law.
But the court's failure to make a record of the interview in chambers with
the child as provided in section 14.07 is not fundamental error and the failure
to object waives the error.2 37 If it can be said with assurance that parties
had a right to jury trial with respect to matters of custody and that the jury
verdict was binding in those matters under former law, 238 that law is unchanged. 239 But with respect to what was denominated a right of visitation,
230. See Smith, ProceduralAspects of Child Conservatorship in

& COMMUNITY PROPERTY 27, 29-30 (J. McKnight ed. 1975).
231. Curtis v. Gibbs, 511 S.W.2d 263, 265 (Tex. 1974).
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232. Id. at 268.
233. See, e.g., Casey v. Jones, 509 S.W.2d 396 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1974,
no writ). The court may now transfer venue, and the court to which venue is transferred
thereafter has continuing jurisdiction. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.06(h) (1975).
234. Smith, supra note 230, at 29-30. See also Smith, supranote 220, at 398-99.
235. Ch. 543, § 4, [1973] Tex. Laws 1459. See Howard v. Pullicino, 519 S.W.2d
254 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, no writ); Seaberg v. Brogunier, 515 S.W.2d 398
(Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
236. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.10 (1975). See Peterson v. Peterson, 502 S.W.2d
178 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston '[lst Dist.] 1973, no writ).
237. Wilkinson v. Evans, 515 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
238. Ch. 305, § 1, [1961] Tex. Laws 663 (repealed 1973); Brunson v. Brunson, 502
S.W.2d 578 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1973, no writ), discussed in McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 66, 92 (1974); Davis v. Davis, 499
S.W.2d 922 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, no writ). With respect to
unanimity of the jury verdict, see Van Wart v. Van Wart, 501 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1973, no writ). Interlocutory orders with respect to the care of children
are not appealable. Gray v. State, 508 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1974,
writ ref'd n.r.e.). With respect to temporary orders under prior law and TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 11.11 (1974) which carries prior law forward without substantive change,
see Smith, Commentary to the Texas Family Code, Title 2, 5 TEX. TECH L. REv. 389,
407-08 (1974). An order transferring a suit to modify a pre-1974 order for support
having venue with respect to the residence of the child is also not appealable. TEx.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.06(f) (1974); Benckenstein v. Benckenstein, 515 S.W.2d 336
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, writ dism'd).
239. In re Y, 516 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
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2 40
a jury trial is not a matter of right nor is a jury verdict binding.

Under the old law, 241 as under the new, 242 the principal factor for consider-

ation in first fixing child conservatorship was "the best interest of the
child."'243 As provided in section 14.01, "the court shall consider the quali-

fications of the respective parents without regard to sex of the parent.

'244

Under section 14.02 a parent as managing conservator has all the powers
of a parent, as enumerated in section 12.04, to the exclusion of the other
parent. 245 If the other parent's right to inherit from the child is sought to

be preserved, the right must be reserved in the decree. Grandparents and
other third persons may also be appointed managing conservators if their appointment is in the best interest of the child. 246 An award of conservatorship

to grandparents may be appropriate, even though neither of the parents are
found to be "unfit persons" to care for the child. 247 Intervening grandparents
may, however, have interests so closely aligned with those of one of the par-

ents that it is materially unfair to allow them as well as the parent with whose
interest theirs are aligned to have more than one set of peremptory challenges

between them in a jury trial involving conservatorship. 248

240. Henderson v. Youngblood, 512 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. Civ. App.-E Paso 1974, no
writ); Walker v. Showalter, 503 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1973,
no writ).
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.08(a) (1975) makes a substantive change in the law with
respect to "the terms . . . of access to the child" ("visitation" under the old law) which
can be altered only on a showing that "the circumstances of the child have materially
and substantially changed." See Howard v. Pullicino, 519 S.W.2d 254 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Austin 1975, no writ).
241. Ch. 305, § 1, [1961] Tex. Laws 663.
242. TaX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.07 (1975).
243. Lundstrom v. Lundstrom, 516 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1974, no writ). With respect to the function of the jury in determining custodianship,
as well as visitation rights, see notes 238-39 supra and accompanying text.
244. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.01 (1975); Adams v. Adams, 519 S.W.2d 502 (Tex.
Civ. App.-El Paso 1975, no writ); Erwin v. Erwin, 505 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1974, no writ), even with regard to children of tender years
with respect to whom preference toward the mother was hitherto entertained. As is evident from the court's discussion in Erwin, the court's conclusions with regard to the
child's best interest are controlling in spite of evidence of bad habits or non-comformist
social practices of the favored parent. 505 S.W.2d at 372. See also Feldman v. Feldman, 45 App. Div. 2d 320, 358 N.Y.S.2d 507 (Sup. Ct. 1974). In State ex rel. Watts
v. Watts, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285 (Fam. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1973), the court held that the presumption in favor of the mother's custody was in violation of federal constitutional standards
of equal protection.
245. The attorney general concluded that as a mere consequence of the parent-child
relationship, either parent has the right to see his child's school record regardless of custodianship. TEx. ATr'y GEN. Op. No. H-ORD42 (1974). See also TEX. ATr'y GEN.
OP. No. H-447 (1974), on the availability of school records to a student's spouse.
With respect to schooling, see also Note, In Loco Parentis and Due Process: Should
These Doctrines Apply to Corporal Punishment?, 26 BAYLOR L. REV. 678 (1974).
246. See, e.g., Smitheal v. Smitheal, 518 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1975, writ dism'd); De La Hoya v. Saldivar, 513 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1974, no writ); Gibson v. Hines, 511 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1974, no

writ).

247. Smitheal v. Smitheal, 518 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, writ
dism'd); Gibson v. Hines, 511 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1974, no writ). De
La Hoya v. Saldivar, 513 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1974, no writ), pointed
out that this result would be appropriate when the parent seeking custodianship had
511
permitted the other person to rear the child from infancy. In re Marriage of D-,
S.W.2d 606 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ), is also such a case because of
its peculiar facts.
248. Perkins v. Freeman, 518 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. 1974).
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The type of change of circumstances that may justify a change of conservatorship is the same under the new law as the old, though the filing of the
writ of habeas corpus to rectify the breach of a foreign state decree no longer
invites an immediate contest for change of conservatorship. 249 There is an
extraordinary comment in Wood v. Wood:250 "There is an ever increasing
inclination by domestic relations courts to consider that unreasonable and arbitrary action of one parent in refusing or hampering the right of reasonable
visitation of the parent out-of-custody constitutes justification for changing
the custody of the child." It is hoped that this statement cannot be demonstrated as factually accurate.
The mere filing of a supersedeas bond will not suspend a judgment involving the care and custody of the child unless the trial court or the appellate
court orders the judgment superseded. 251 Hence, in the absence of such an
order, if any act in defiance of the judgment is committed, the offending party
may be held in contempt. A person may not, however, be imprisoned for
contempt for an act committed outside the presence of the court without a
written order. 25 2 In Credit Bureau of Laredo, Inc. v. State 25" the court concluded that if the permissible penalty for contempt is in excess of that permitted for punishment of a petty offence, there is a constitutional right to
a jury trial.
The interrelationship of the Probate Code provisions dealing with the
guardianship of the estate of a minor and those of the Family Code with respect to the powers of a parental managing conservator are not yet resolved.
Family Code section 14.02(a) provides that a parental managing conservator
has all the rights, privileges, duties, and powers of a parent "to the exclusion
of the other parent," subject only to the powers of a possessory conservator
in any limitation imposed by judicial order in allowing access to the child.
Section 12.04(4) gives the parent "the duty to manage the estate of the
child"; section 12.04(7), "the power to represent the child in legal action
and to make other decisions of substantial legal significance concerning the
child"; and section 12.04(8), "the power . . . to disburse any funds for the

benefit of the child." On its face the provision of section 14.02(a) when read
in conjunction with sections 12.04(4), (7) and (8) gives powers concurrent
with those exercisable by the guardian of the estate of the child. Without
249. Unless the child has been within the state for one year. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 14.10 (1975); Seaberg v. Brogunier, 515 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1974,
writ ref'd n.r.e.). See Brown v. Brown, 500 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1973, no writ), an example of the old law under which the lines dividing habeas corpus
and change of conservatorship were seriously blurred. See also O'Dell v. Brame, 517
S.W.2d 920 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1974, no writ).
250. 510 S.W.2d 399, 400 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1974, no writ).
251. Ex parte Henderson, 512 S.W.2d 37 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1974, no writ);
TEx. R. Civ. P. 364(f).
252. Ex parte Spencer, 508 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1974, no writ).
253. 515 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ granted). In Duval
v. Duval, 322 A.2d 1 (N.H. 1974), the court held that a person facing civil contempt
charges was not necessarily entitled to representation by counsel, whether or not the conviction might lead to imprisonment. The court remanded the case of the contemnor,
held for non-payment of child support, for the trial court's determination of whether the
issues were so complex that assistance of counsel would be required in order to prevent
unfairness. See also Schutz v. Helm, 368 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Wis. 1973).
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any reference to the Family Code, two recent cases suggest that there are
circumstances when a conflict of interest between parent and child exists, so
that a third person should be appointed guardian of the estate of the child, 254
or if the parent has been appointed guardian of the estate of the child, a
guardian ad litem should be appointed to represent the child's interest. 255 A
non-parental managing conservator is not, however, vested under provisions
of section 14.02(b) with powers correlative to those of section 12.04(4) with
respect to the management of the estate of the child, but is vested with those
in sections 12.04(7) and (8),256 unless the parent-child relationship has been
terminated or the child is an orphan. 257 Probate Code section 118 allows
a child who has attained the age of fourteen to choose a successor guardian
if his nominee is suitable and competent in the judgment of the court.25 8 The
similar provision in section 14.07 of the Family Code with respect to the
child's choice of his managing conservator was based on the provision of the
Probate Code. 259
C. Support

Mitchim260

In Mitchim v.
the Supreme Court of Texas held that the Arizona law enables an Arizona court to render an in personam support judgment against a Texas resident not served personally with process in Arizona,
in the sense of his being physically present to receive it, but rather by constructive service of process under the Arizona long-arm statute. 26 1 Texas residents are therefore vulnerable to the effects of similar statutes in other jurisdictions. If Texas should enact such a statute, 2 2 Texas courts would be empowered to make similar decrees, 26 3 as well as to render money judgments
under Family Code section 14.09(c) 26 4 for arrears in child support which
would be enforceable in a sister state jurisdiction. (With respect to that section in another context, it may be questioned whether an arrearage arising
254.
writ).
255.
n.r.e.).
ment of

Phillips v. Phillips, 511 S.W.2d 748 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1974, no
Hamill v. Brashear, 513 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, writ ref'd
Under the circumstances of that case, however, the court held that the appointa guardian ad litem was inappropriate and indeed not authorized by the Probate

Code.

256. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.02(b)(6), (7) (1975).
257. Id. § 14.02(8).

258. In re Estates of Carrigan, 517 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, no

writ).
259. See Smith, Commentary to the Texas Family Code, Title 2, 5 TEx. TEcH L.
REV. 389, 431-32 (1974).
260. 518 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. 1975).
261. Id. at 364. ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2) provides in part: "When the defendant
is a . . . person . . . [who] has caused an event to occur in this state out of which

the claim which is the subject of the complaint arose, service may be made as herein
provided, and when so made shall be of the same effect as personal service within the
state."
262. An amendment to the Family Code would be appropriate. If a statute of
broader application is wanted, TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (1964) may be
amended to achieve that result.
263. See Davi v. Davi, 456 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1970, writ
dism'd), discussed in Smith, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 26 Sw. L.J. 51,
53 n.18 (1972). See also McKnight & Ragglo, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 25 Sw. L.J. 34, 59 n.179 (1971).
264. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.09(c) (1975).
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under a court order handed down prior to January 1, 1974, could be the subject of a money decree, since the original order was made in contemplation
of enforcement only by contempt.2 65) Such a means of enforcement will,
however, obviate recourse to the dull, and often rusty, blade of the Uniform
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, 266 especially if the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act would expedite enforcement of the Texas
judgment without suit in the sister state where the spouse in arrears for child
support resides. 26 7 If under the old or the present law a non-resident voluntarily enters the state to invoke the jurisdiction of the courts to enforce rights
of custodianship, other than for returning a child by a writ of habeas corpus,
he invokes the general jurisdiction of the court for enforcement or alteration
268
of support payments.
Under section 14.07269 the best interest of the child is the primary concern
for determination of support of the child, just as it is with respect to the appointment of a proper managing conservator. But the phrase may have
somewhat different emphasis with respect to fixing support from that which
it has in relation to fixing conservatorship; presumably it may be argued that
it is in the best interest of the child to have the largest possible support a
judge could order paid by both parents. Section 14.07(b) provides also that
"the courts shall consider the circumstances of the parent." But consideration of a parent's "earning potential" in fixing support payment can present
some difficulty.270 Not only must a parent's financial ability to pay for the
support of the child be considered but also his ability to support himself along
with the ability of the parent-conservator to support the child. 271 But Texas
law does not demand that the financial contribution of both parents be
equal.

272

With respect to a court order to pay child support pendente lite, once a
judgment of divorce is granted, the pre-judgment order does not continue,
nor will granting a new trial revive it unless the court so provides pending
273
appeal or during other post-judgment proceedings.
265. Cf. id. § 14.05(c).
266. Id. ch. 21 (URESA).
267. For an example of some of the difficulties encountered under URESA, see
Strader v. Strader, 517 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1974, no writ). But if any
rule of law is enunciated there, it escapes me. For clarification of the rules with respect
to availability of jury trial under URESA, see Tnx. ATr'Y GEN. Op. Nos. H-218, H270 (1974).
268. Hollis v. Hollis, .508 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ).
But under Tx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.10(d) (1975), if in the state for the sole purpose
of compelling the return of the child through a habeas corpus proceeding, a foreign relator is not amenable to civil process and is subject only to the jurisdiction of that civil
court in which the writ is pending and only for purposes of the writ.
269. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.07 (1975).
270. See Wetzel v. Wetzel, 514 S.W.2d 283 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, no
writ).
271. Anderson v. Anderson, 503 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1973,
no writ).
272. Cooper v. Cooper, 513 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974,
no writ). See also Conway v. Dana, 456 Pa. 536, 318 A.2d 324 (1974).
273., Ex parte Thompson, 510 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ).
For a contempt decree that is both criminal and civil in nature with respect to non-payment of alimony and child support pendente lite, see Ex parte Dean, 517 S.W.2d 365
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In Gonzalez v. Texas Employers Insurance Ass'n 274 the court held that
since the Texas Workmen's Compensation Act 275 makes death benefits payable to children "without regard to the question of dependency," an illegitimate child has the same standing as the legitimate child to claim death benefits under the act without any showing of actual dependency. The court relied on Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 2711 rather than put it aside
on the basis of "finely carved distinctions" 27 7 which had been advanced unsuccessfully in Weber itself in order to bring the Texas case within the ambit
278
of Labine v. Vincent.
Just as it must weigh all factors in the ability of parents to provide for
their children when making an initial order for child support payments, a
court called upon to reduce or increase child support payments must review
2 79
those same factors. But to say, as the court does, in Dennis v. Dennis
that "any economic changes brought about by [a parent's] remarriage must
not militate against his dependent children" is too broad as a statement of
a general proposition for the guidance of a court in considering a petition
for reduction in child support payments. In another context 280 it was asserted that an increase in child support payments could not be ordered because the custodial parent had not filed a sworn itemized report of the manner in which prior child support payments had been expended, as required
by old article 4639(a). 28 1 The court rejected this contention as not having
any bearing on the exercise of judicial power with respect to ordering a parent
to support a child. 282 Under the old law the parent seeking reduction of child
support payments, as well as a change in rights of conservatorship, would proceed in the court granting the original decree for child support payments; but
if the opposing parent invoked the ordinary rules of venue as to rights of
conservatorship, the petitioner would have to proceed by way of the separate
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, no writ). For a post-divorce contempt decree of the same nature see In re McLemore, 515 S.W.2d 356 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1974, no writ).
274. 509 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Related problems with respect to the rights of illegitimates are dealt with in White, The Wrongful
Death Statutes-A Constitutional Problem, 12 Hous. L. REv. 35, 54 (1975). See TEX.
Arr'Y GEN. Op.No. H-565 (1975), with respect to the rights of illegitimates to be covered by the state's infant immunization program.
275. TEX.REv.Civ. STAT. ANN.art. 8306, § 8a (Supp. 1974).
276. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
277. 509 S.W.2d at 426.
278. 401 U.S. 532 (1971). TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 8a (Supp.
1974), provides that death benefits "shall be distributed among the beneficiaries as may
be entitled . ..according to the laws of descent and distribution." Although the Texas
statute does not require dependency, the problem of applicability of the statute in this
case was "lessened ... by undisputed proof that the minor claimant . . .lived with the
deceased employee and was recognized by him as his child." 509 S.W.2d at 427.
279. 512 S.W.2d 699 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, no writ). On the discoverability
of the assets of a subsequent spouse of a parent liable for support, see Condon v. Condon, 295 So. 2d 681 (Fla. App. 1974).
280. White v. White, 503 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973, no writ).
281. Ch. 402, § 1, [1941] Tex. Laws 660.
282. As of Jan. 1, 1974, the provision was repealed and replaced with the much attenuated requirement that a non-parental managing conservator file an annual "report of
facts concerning the child's welfare, including his whereabouts and physical condition."
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.01(d) (1975). The provision is derived from TEX. PROB.
CODE ANN. § 399(a) (1956).
See Smith, Commentary to the Texas Family Code, Title 2, 5 TEX.TEcH L. REV.389, 425 (1974).
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suit in the court of the custodial parent's residence to seek a change in those
rights. 28 3 Under the new law the court of original jurisdiction maintains continuing jurisdiction for all purposes of conservatorship and support under section 11.05 with power of the court to transfer the proceedings under section
11.06 to the court of appropriate venue where the child resides as defined
in section 11.04(c). 21 4 The new law provides in section 14.08(d) that a
motion to modify the decree of conservatorship may not be made earlier than
one year after the date of the initial decree "unless the court decides on the
basis of affidavit that there is reason to believe that the child's present environment may endanger his physical health or significantly impair his emotional development. ' 28 5 In its present form this provision may bar reconsideration of an award for child support because of the inability of the parent
28 6
to comply with the award.
In other jurisdictions the courts have concluded that reduction of the age
of majority to eighteen terminates the duty of support at that age, whereas
prior court orders had required support up to the former age of majority at
twenty-one. 287 Texas courts are not, however, affected by our change of the
age of majority since prior law did not authorize a judicial order for child
support beyond the age of eighteen in ordinary circumstances. 288 In Davidson v. Davidson28 9 the divorce court had ordered the father to make monthly

support payments of a specified amount for each of his four children until
they attained the age of eighteen. After two of the children had attained
that age and a large arrearage for support had built up, the mother brought
proceedings for enforcement of the decree. The trial court ordered him to
pay a specified amount each week until he liquidated the arrearage. In response to the father's argument that the court lacked jurisdiction to make the
order, the appellate court held that the relief was in the nature of an enforcement provision in lieu of punishment for contempt and not an order to pay
child support for the support of children who had already reached the age
200
of eighteen.
283.

Ennunciation of the old law and its development is found in Smith, Family Law,

Annual Survey of Texas Law, 22 Sw. L.J. 115, 118-21 (1968); McKnight & Raggio,

Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 25 Sw. L.J. 34, 58 (1971); Smith, Family
Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 26 Sw. L.J. 31, 54 (1972), in which some of the

draftsmen of present legislation indicate the course of thought that generated current re-

form. See also Smith, Commentary on the Texas Family Code, Title 2, 5 TEX. TECH
L. REV. 389, 396-99 (1974); Smith, Procedural Aspects of Child Conservatorship in
TEXAS FAMILY LAW & COMMUNITY PROPERTY 27 (J. McKnight ed. 1975).

284. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 11.04-.06 (1975). See Smith, supra note 282, at 39596. For an example of the cumbersome situation under the old law, see Shoemate v.

Winkley, 505 S.W.2d 357 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1974, no writ).
285. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.08(d) (1975).

286. The provision should, therefore, be amended to allow that sort of modification
at least.
287. See, e.g., Rusham v. Rusham, 21 Ariz. App. 101, 515 P.2d 1199 (1973); Wal-

dron v. Waldron, 13 11. App. 3d 964, 301 N.E.2d 167 (1974); Price v. Price, 51 Mich.
App. 656, 215 N.W.2d 756 (1974).

288. Ch. 305, § 1, [1961] Tex. Laws 663, carried forward in Tax. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 14.05(a) (1975). But federal assistance payments for children between the ages of
18 and 21 are not affected by the change in the Texas age of majority. TEx. Arr'Y

GEN. Op. No. H-585 (1975).

289. 501 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1973, no writ).

290. See Ex parte Hooks, 415 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. 1967), discussed in Rasor, Family
Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 23 Sw. LJ.60, 71 (1969).
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With respect to contractual obligations to pay child support for children
beyond the age of eighteen, these contracts should not be affected by the
change of age of majority, unless some implied term in the contract might
be deduced from the circumstances surrounding its making. 291 Nor does the
reduction of child support payments for purposes of judicial enforcement affect the contractual rights of a promisee-spouse under a settlement agreement. 292 In Lee v. Lee 293 the parents had entered into a contract whereby
the father would pay the mother an agreed amount monthly for the support
of two minor children. The divorce court awarded custody of the two children to the mother and apparently ordered the father to pay child support
in the amount agreed. After one of the children went to live with the father,
he successfully sought a reduction in child support payments. The mother
thereupon brought suit for enforcement of the agreement. The father defended on the ground that the parties in their contract had intended that its
terms should apply only so long as the children were in the actual custody
of the mother. The appellate court concluded that the parties had not
reached such an understanding and the mother might enforce the terms of
the contract. In another case, In re McLemore,294 the father was also ordered to pay a certain monthly sum as provided in a property settlement
agreement entered into by the husband and wife prior to their divorce. For
a time, the father made the payments as ordered and also made some additional payments to cover the expenses of the children. After the father's
child support payments had fallen into substantial arrears, the mother moved
to have the father cited for contempt, and he was imprisoned for his failure
to obey the prior order of the court. In his petition for a writ of habeas
corpus the father asserted an agreement on the part of the mother to accept
the additional payment in lieu of future obligations for monthly payment of
child support, as well as an agreed reduction in amount. In rejecting the
father's contention, the court to which the writ was addressed appears to have
treated the alleged agreement between the former spouses as irrelevant. 29 5
The court said that "the extra payments made by

. .

.[the father] on behalf

of his children were made under his common law duty to support his children.
. .. The child support ordered under . .. [the old law], or its successor

• . .may be viewed as a court-enforced fulfillment of this common law obligation; but voluntary payments made in fulfillment, or partial fulfillment,
of the common law obligation are not necessarily to be offset against the statutory obligation enforced by a court order. ' 29 6 In Lee, in contrast to McLemore, the court relies wholly on contractual obligations as apart from judicial
orders, whereas in McLemore the sanctity of the judicial order serves as the
291. See Ovaitt v. Ovaitt, 43 Mich. App. 628, 204 N.W.2d 753 (1972); cf. Whitt v.
Whitt, 490 S.W.2d 159 (Tenn. 1974).
292. See McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 66, 94
(1974), and authorities there cited.
293. 509 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
294. 515 S.W.2d 356 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ).
295. The court also regarded the father's argument that his duty to pay was rooted
in his contractual obligation as beside the point.
296. 515 S.W.2d at 358.
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court's touchstone because the husband sought relief through a writ of habeas
corpus. In Lee section 14.09(c), which after January 1, 1974, allows the
enforcement of arrears in child support as a debt, was held inapplicable. In
Forney v. Jorrie,2 97 also initially litigated prior to January 1, 1974, the
mother sought to enforce arrears of child support based wholly on non-compliance with the divorce court's decree. The old law afforded relief only by
way of contempt since the mother's claim was "based upon the judgment and
not [on] any purported contractual agreement for child support." The exhusband was also in arrears in periodic payments ordered by the divorce
court in lieu of a division of community property. The appellate court held
that a judgment for anticipatory breach was foreclosed by the absence of
pleading to support it.298 In Lee the mother also sought recovery for unmatured payments under the doctrine of anticipatory breach. With respect to
the latter, the appellate court held that she might recover the present value
of the unmatured future support payments with interest at six percent to be
used in discounting that amount.
The federal Social Service Amendments of 1974299 provide for the establishment in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare of means to
assist the states in locating absent parties, establishing paternity, and obtaining child support orders and enforcing them.30 0 The Parent Locater Service
established by the act should be of considerable assistance for finding missing
parents through the records of federal departments and agencies. The act
also allows garnishment of wages due from the federal government to any
individual, as though the United States were a private employer, for the purposes of meeting obligations of child support and alimony. Since a private
employer would not be subject to garnishment in this circumstance in Texas,
it does not appear that the federal government offices in Texas would be either.3 0 ' The act also provides for the opening of federal courts to assist the
states to enforce court orders for support against absent parents under certain
circumstances. The very considerable ramifications of this federal legislation
must await implementation of the act.

297. 511 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
298. The ex-husband also argued that the court order with respect to periodic payments had not provided for acceleration on failure to comply with the order.
299. P.L. No. 93-647 (Jan. 4, 1975).
300. Id. pt. D, §§ 451-60.

301. Sed quaere with respect to federal government offices located in other jurisdictions where wages are garnishable for arrears in child support payments.

